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DISSENT: THE REWARDS AND RISKS OF JUDICIAL
DISAGREEMENT IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
ANDREW LYNCH∗
[This article examines the justifications which support the capacity of individual justices to voice
their disagreement from a majority through the writing of dissenting opinions. In doing so, it employs
extensive comparison with the practice of dissent in other jurisdictions, particularly that of the
United States Supreme Court. The author contends that there are political, procedural and
developmental benefits provided by the expression of disagreement amongst the bench. However,
arguments for judicial restraint are also weighed, especially in respect of the practice of persistent
dissent. The effectiveness of stare decisis as a check on disagreement — and the relationship between
the two in general — is also considered.]
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I   INTRODUCTION
The occurrence of dissent is a phenomenon of judicial work which attracts
direct consideration only sporadically. Individual dissenting opinions may often
receive attention in cases of interest to the public, but there has been only a
limited effort to reflect upon the role of dissent in legal reasoning generally.
While the significance of the dissenting opinion has received various forms of
tacit acknowledgment over the years — particularly in the United States, where
it has long held a peculiar romantic fascination — until recently, serious regard
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had not been given to this important aspect of judge-made law.1 The purpose of
this article is to add to this discussion and to extend it to a consideration of the
practice of dissent in the High Court of Australia, which has so far received little
direct attention.
It is apparent that, while a dissent may too often be ‘no more than an aberrant
view arising out of an individual justice’s prejudices — or … “cantankerous-
ness”’,2 the ability to give voice to disagreement with one’s colleagues is an
important facility. First, it has consequences for how a court presents itself as an
arm of government to the public which it exists to serve. Second, a court’s work
can be qualitatively improved through the acknowledgment — and more
proactively, management — of dissension amongst its members. Third, dissent
can exercise an influence upon the law itself and drive it in new directions,
which may enable the law to keep in step with changing community needs and
standards. Part II of this article considers how the possibility of dissent fulfils
these interrelated functions.
While there is little to be said in favour of responding to these factors with a
case for compulsory unanimity, there remain significant arguments for judicial
restraint in the use of dissent. Part III will address the concern that dissent can
spawn a multiplicity of conflicting voices which may damage a court’s ability to
perform effectively and its standing in the community. The doctrine of precedent
is the prime mechanism developed within the common law tradition to curb the
negative consequences that can flow from excessive individualism and dis-
agreement on the bench. In a court of last resort, however, precedential value
occupies a more precarious position than in lower courts within the hierarchy.
How dissent is managed and the degree to which precedent restrains judges in
final courts will be considered in Part IV.
II   FUNCTIONS OF  DISSENT
Broadly speaking, dissent serves three crucial functions. First, the ability to
dissent ensures that the judicial arm of government enjoys certain key capabili-
ties associated with a society governed in accordance with democratic principles
and values. It operates and, perhaps more importantly, is seen to operate, in
harmony with the tenets of the political settlement. Second, the process of
adjudication may benefit from the possibility of dissenting opinions, which can
1 Gaffney proclaimed in 1994 that ‘the value of dissenting opinions is now beyond question’:
Edward Gaffney Jr, ‘The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative of Judicial Civility’ (1994)
28 Valparaiso University Law Review 583, 591. Other commentators, however, disagree and
seem only to be warming to the question. In recent years, particularly significant contributions to
this debate were made by John Alder, ‘Dissents in Courts of Last Resort: Tragic Choices?’
(2000) 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 221; Robert Flanders Jr, ‘The Utility of Separate
Judicial Opinions in Appellate Courts of Last Resort: Why Dissents Are Valuable’ (1999) 4
Roger Williams University Law Review 401; Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, ‘The Dissenting
Opinion: Voices of the Future?’ (2000) 38 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 495; Rory Little, ‘Reading
Justice Brennan: Is There a “Right” to Dissent?’ (1999) 50 Hastings Law Journal 683. Addi-
tionally, Justice William Brennan’s highly influential 1986 contribution — ‘In Defense of Dis-
sents’ (1986) 37 Hastings Law Journal 427 — was reprinted in (1999) 50 Hastings Law Journal
671.
2 Alan Barth, Prophets with Honor: Great Dissents and Great Dissenters in the Supreme Court
(1974) 7.
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provide a stimulus to clearer judgment writing generally and also serve to clarify
majority views by throwing them into sharper relief. Moreover, the presence of
dissenting opinions speaks to the integrity of that process and the independence
with which the judiciary is allowed to discharge its functions. Third, the law
itself may be developed and advanced over time through the use of dissent. In
this respect, an ability to dissent enables the law to admit new ideas and adapt
old doctrines, exposing them to scrutiny and consideration both inside and
outside the court. Thus, dissent facilitates progression and change, and does so in
a more open and less abrupt way than might occur in the absence of any ability
to deliver such opinions.
These three functions of dissent will be explored more fully below. It should
be noted, however, that in many instances similar functions are satisfied by the
presence of concurring judgments.3 This part will conclude by considering the
degree to which these functions are fulfilled by the seriatim practice of judgment
delivery, rather than being exclusively the province of dissenting opinions, and
whether their relevance to an examination focused specifically upon dissent is
lessened as a result.
A  Deliberation, Dissent and Democracy
As evidence of the deliberative decision-making process engaged in by the
courts, it may be argued that dissenting judgments inject a readily recognisable
democratic tone into an arm of government which is often perceived as remote
and unaccountable.
It is well known that Chief Justice John Marshall imposed upon his colleagues
the practice of delivering only unanimous opinions in order to secure the
fledgling authority of the United States Supreme Court.4 President Thomas
Jefferson’s objections to this development are equally well documented:
The Judges holding their offices for life are under two responsibilities only. 1.
Impeachment. 2. Individual reputation. But this practice compleatly withdraws
them from both. For nobody knows what opinions any individual member gave
in any case, nor even that he who delivers the opinion, concurred in it himself.
Be the opinion therefore ever so impeachable, having been done in the dark it
can be proved on no one. As to the 2d guarantee, personal reputation, it is
shielded compleatly. The practice is certainly convenient for the lazy, the mod-
est & the incompetent.5
3 The distinction between concurring and dissenting judgments is discussed in Andrew Lynch,
‘Dissent: Towards a Methodology for Measuring Judicial Disagreement in the High Court of
Australia’ (2002) 24 Sydney Law Review 470, 476.
4 See almost any of the articles cited in this article dealing with American dissent, but especially
John Kelsh, ‘The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States Supreme Court 1790–1945’
(1999) 77 Washington University Law Quarterly 137, 143–52; Meredith Kolsky, ‘Justice Wil-
liam Johnson and the History of Supreme Court Dissent’ (1995) 83 Georgetown Law Journal
2069; A J Levin, ‘Mr Justice William Johnson, Creative Dissenter’ (1944) 43 Michigan Law
Review 497, 520–3; Donald Morgan, ‘Mr Justice William Johnson and the Constitution’ (1944)
57 Harvard Law Review 328, 331–5; Bernard Schwartz, A History of the Supreme Court (1993)
39.
5 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson, 27 October 1822 in Levin, above n 4,
513–15.
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Jefferson’s appointment of William Johnson as an Associate Justice — and his
subsequent stream of advice to him on breaking Marshall CJ’s grip on the Court
— ensured that the unanimous opinion as a regular practice was soon under-
mined.6 These events are notable for two reasons. First, Marshall CJ’s reform,
albeit short-lived, is a rare example of a common law court excluding the
possibility of dissent. Perhaps a more familiar example to antipodean lawyers is
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which until 1966 denied any
capacity to dissent and insisted upon unanimous advice being given from the
Council to Her Majesty. For most of the time that the Privy Council existed
within our court hierarchy, its Australian members in particular rankled against
this constraint, largely to no avail.7 Second, Jefferson’s complaint about the lack
of transparency in the Court’s decisions goes to the role and relationships of the
judicial arm within a democratic society.
This link between an ability to dissent and the democratic ideal which under-
pins the entire regime has been stressed by a number of subsequent commenta-
tors. In 1948, Justice William Douglas was keen to make this connection clear
through the use of the dramatic examples readily available to him at the time:
Certainty and unanimity of the law are possible both under the fascist and
communist systems. They are not only possible; they are indispensable; for
complete subservience to the political regime is a sine qua non to judicial sur-
vival under either system. One cannot imagine the courts of Hitler engaged in a
public debate over the principles of Der Führer, with a minority of one or four
deploring or denouncing the principles themselves. One cannot imagine a judge
of a communist court dissenting against the decrees of the Kremlin.8
Rather than employing comparative illustrations, in his defence of dissents
America’s Justice William Brennan preferred to show the connection between
dissent and democracy through arguments characterising the former as essential
to the operations of the ‘marketplace of ideas’ and the ‘judicial town meeting’.9
Such phrases are evocative of a coming together of equals with contrary opinions
6 Kolsky speculates that ‘had Marshall’s practice of issuing solo opinions continued unchallenged
throughout his entire tenure, this methodology might still be employed today’: Kolsky,
above n 4, 2069. Indeed, ‘Justice Johnson’s independence blazed the trail for future dissenters’:
at 2081. See also letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson, 12 June 1823 in Levin,
above n 4, 518; See Hampton Carson, The History of the Supreme Court of the United States
(1902) vol 1, 229.
7 Alder, above n 1, 236. It was Sir Garfield Barwick who finally succeeded in persuading their
Lordships to do away with this practice: David Marr, Barwick (1980) 219. For an examination of
the tradition of the Privy Council’s practice and comparison with that of final courts in Com-
monwealth countries, as well as in the United States, see Edward McWhinney, ‘Judicial Concur-
rences and Dissents: A Comparative View of Opinion-Writing in Final Appellate Tribunals’
(1953) 31 Canadian Bar Review 595.
8 Justice William Douglas, ‘The Dissent: A Safeguard of Democracy’ (1948) 32 Journal of the
American Judicature Society 104, 105. Similar sentiments were expressed by Judge Stanley
Fuld, ‘The Voices of Dissent’ (1962) 62 Columbia Law Review 923, 926:
I am positive that disagreement among judges is as true to the character of democracy, and as
vital, as freedom of speech itself. The affairs of government, no less than the work of the
courts, could not be conducted by democratic standards without that right of dissent. Indeed,
we may remind ourselves, unanimity in the law is possible only in fascist and communist
countries.
9 Brennan, above n 1, 430. Unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, all references to Justice
Brennan are to the judge of the United States Supreme Court.
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for the purposes of exchange and debate — the process exists for ‘individuals
and groups representing all viewpoints and perspectives’.10 Alder has taken such
sentiments and built them into his study of dissent as disagreement between
incommensurable values:
the practice of dissent helps to offset the democratic deficit in the common law.
The judges represent not a constituency of electors but one of competing so-
cietal values. These are generated by a series of shifting and provisional settle-
ments made by constantly changing panels of individuals having broad discre-
tion, the application of which is constrained by conventional understandings of
what is legally relevant.11
Obviously, the extent to which we can appreciate the judicial arm as a mani-
festation of democratic governance may be hampered by a hesitance to equate
this concept with the familiar feature of electoral representation. But even aside
from the absence of any direct connection between the judiciary and the citizens
within a society, it is difficult to accept at face value Alder’s claim that judicial
officers represent constituencies of ‘competing societal values’. Surely its
adequacy in doing so must be open to serious doubt.12 For this reason, it is
preferable to abandon any attempt to incorporate representation into a demo-
cratic justification of judicial work. This need not rob the courts of such legiti-
macy. Rather, scrutiny should be directed towards the judicial method —
including the role of dissenting opinions — as a manifestation of democratic
ideals through deliberation.
Although many commentators have asserted that dissenting judgments inject a
democratic tone into judicial work, Stack was the first to suggest a plausible
basis for this view. Stack attempts to consider the impact of dissent upon both an
institutional and an interpretative approach to finding a connection between the
10 Ibid 437.
11 Alder, above n 1, 223 (citations omitted).
12 See John Gava, ‘The Rise of the Hero Judge’ (2001) 24 University of New South Wales Law
Journal 747, 754; Justice Michael Kirby, ‘The Constitutional Centenary and the Counting of
Blessings’ (1997) 2 Newcastle Law Review 1, 9. In his attempt to explain the proper role of
community values in legal methodology, Braithwaite said:
Where one wants diversity is in the judicial deliberation itself. First, one should aspire to a
court which is itself somewhat diverse, perhaps at least in terms of sex, age, region, religion
and ethnicity. Second, one should aspire to a court which is exquisitely open to the diversity of
ways of thinking in the community.
John Braithwaite, ‘Community Values and Australian Jurisprudence’ (1995) 17 Sydney Law
Review 351, 367 (citations omitted). Whilst the degree to which the High Court fulfils the sec-
ond aspiration may be open to conjecture, it cannot be denied that its personnel are traditionally
drawn from a narrow section of the community, which must inhibit their capacity to fulfil the
function Alder has identified: see Eddy Neumann, The High Court of Australia: A Collective
Portrait 1903–1972 (2nd ed, 1973) chs 2–4.
In saying this, however, I am not necessarily taking issue with Alder’s main thesis that it is
disagreement over values which underpins dissent — a point acknowledged in Ben Palmer,
‘Causes of Dissents: Judicial Self-Restraint or Abdication?’ (1948) 34 American Bar Association
Journal 761, 765; Roscoe Pound, ‘Cacoethes Dissentiendi: The Heated Judicial Dissent’ (1953)
39 American Bar Association Journal 794, 796. There may still be sharp division over values
amongst the justices, whilst those values remain only narrowly representative of the community.
My point here, however, is that a resort to judicial representation of values cannot sustain a
democratic defence of judicial power.
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United States Supreme Court and the rule of law.13 His arguments in respect of
institutional efforts to cement the Court with the rule of law have very limited
relevance to the Australian context where the High Court’s use of seriatim
opinions far outstrips the occurrence of unanimity. In any event, Stack concludes
that ‘[t]he presence of a dissenting Justice demonstrates that behind the word
“Court” in the “opinion of the Court” sit individual Justices’14 and this under-
mines the rule of law’s well-known claim that it is not the ‘rule of men’. The
interpretative method discussed by Stack probably relies too heavily upon a
Dworkinian basis of legal determinacy to gain universal acceptance. Yet, within
the specific context of his study, Stack fairly recounts Dworkin’s own view that
dissent is an example of his theory of the judicial process as one of ‘fit and
justification’.15 Stack, however, remains sceptical of this argument16 and cannot
escape the conclusion that, in fact, ‘dissents cast doubt on the determinacy of the
Court’s judgments, and thus on the use of law as integrity to provide a principled
connection between the Court and the rule of law.’17
This leads Stack to shift his focus to an examination of political legitimacy and
it is here that he adds meaningfully to the general suggestion that dissent is
reflective of democracy. The use of a decision-making process which enables
dissent demonstrates ‘the particular American commitment to a deliberative
conception of democracy’.18 In a passage which mirrors the ideas of Justice
Brennan and (to an extent) those advanced by Alder, yet pinpoints how the
connection to democracy is made in respect of the judicial arm, Stack explains
that:
No less than Congress, the Court is a collegial body in which members of
roughly equal rank make authoritative determinations backed by coercive force
in the name of our government. With these institutional characteristics, the
Court’s lack of an electoral connection does not put it outside the commitments
of deliberative democracy. Rather, if the Court reaches its judgments through a
deliberative process, its power of judicial review will share a basis with the
power of representatives in Congress to resist the preferences of citizens — the
commitment to making social choices through a deliberative interchange
among equals.19
13 Kevin Stack, ‘The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court’ (1996) 105 Yale Law Journal 2235.
14 Ibid 2240. Cf L’Heureux-Dubé, above n 1, 503.
15 Stack, above n 13, 2244.
16 Stack’s dissatisfaction with Dworkin’s Hercules model and any light it sheds on dissension was
noted in Lynch, above n 3, 486 fn 38.
17 Stack, above n 13, 2245. Similarly, Shklar argued that dissent betrayed the inconsistencies of
legalism: ‘The politics of judicial legislation is exposed as such only when there is conflict. As
long as there is no opposition to them, decisions seem to be not choices but accepted necessities.
… Without consensus the appearance of neutrality evaporates’: Judith Shklar, Legalism (1964)
11–13.
18 Stack, above n 13, 2249.
19 Ibid 2254 (citations omitted). Justice L’Heureux-Dubé also takes the view that ‘accepting
dissenting opinions injects a certain measure of democracy … into the judicial decisionmaking
process, since every judge has an opportunity to participate fully, even while the majority deci-
sion rules the outcome’: L’Heureux-Dubé, above n 1, 503. Levin characterises dissent as ‘a
resort to the particular when the general seeks to subdue the dissenter — hence, it becomes
synonymous with individuality, liberty, independence but not anarchy or insensate prejudice.
Therefore, dissent is democracy’s most valuable instrument’: Levin, above n 4, 547.
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This passage indicates the significance, as well as the substance, of Stack’s
argument. In the wider context, dissent may be one of a number of features of the
judicial arm which enable an appreciation of its democratic credentials. This may
have real importance in addressing concerns about the legitimate scope of
judicial review.20 For several decades, many American scholars have grappled
with the problem of reconciling a majoritarian image of democracy with judicial
review by unaccountable and unrepresentative courts.21 Although much of the
following draws upon American commentary, this is far from being an issue that
is confined to the United States.22 Indeed, as the High Court of Australia more
openly espoused its methodology in the 1980s and delivered a number of
controversial decisions, criticism of it hinged to a large degree on a perceived
lack of democratic standing — and the Court’s defenders responded in turn.23
While a few overcome this dilemma simply by attacking the position of the
courts within the constitutional framework,24 others have managed to accommo-
20 Though it should be noted that Stack recoils from engaging in this debate by applying the
following caveat: ‘my argument is only that deliberative process is a necessary but not sufficient
condition of the Court’s consistency with democracy (even on the deliberative view) as well as
of the Court’s legitimacy’: Stack, above n 13, 2255.
21 Friedman has recently lamented the thrall in which such scholars are held by the counter-
majoritarian problem:
There is every reason to believe the counter-majoritarian problem is a less-than-accurate way
of characterizing the practice of judicial review. As numerous scholars have observed, both
halves of the supposed difficulty are subject to theoretical and empirical challenge. On the one
hand, there is every reason to doubt that what we think of as majoritarian politics is designed
to, could, should, or does register majoritarian preferences. Thus, judicial review regularly is
compared to some imaginary baseline that does not exist. On the other hand, judicial review is
a long-established part of our governmental structure. It yields remarkably majoritarian re-
sults, and is a process that is different from majoritarian politics but nonetheless responsive to
it. In short, whatever judicial review is about, describing its operation requires something far
more nuanced than the counter-majoritarian explanation provides.
Barry Friedman, ‘The Counter-Majoritarian Problem and the Pathology of Constitutional Schol-
arship’ (2001) 95 Northwestern University Law Review 933, 936 (emphasis in original, citations
omitted). See also Barry Friedman, ‘The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One:
The Road to Judicial Supremacy’ (1998) 73 New York University Law Review 333.
22 The title of Robert Bork’s latest book indicates his view of the extent of the problem: Coercing
Virtue: The Worldwide Rule of Judges (2002).
23 See, eg, G L Davies, ‘The Judiciary — Maintaining the Balance’ in P D Finn (ed), Essays on
Law and Government — Volume 1: Principles and Values (1995) 267, 279–82; Chief Justice
John Doyle, ‘Implications of Judicial Law-Making’ in Cheryl Saunders (ed), Courts of Final
Jurisdiction: The Mason Court in Australia (1996) 84, 86; Brian Galligan, ‘The Australian High
Court’s Role in Institutional Maintenance and Development’ in Charles Sampford and Kim
Preston (eds), Interpreting Constitutions: Theories, Principles and Institutions (1996) 184, 186;
Justice Michael Kirby, ‘Judicial Activism’ (1997) 27 University of Western Australia Law Re-
view 1, 15; Justice Michael McHugh, ‘The Judicial Method’ (1999) 73 Australian Law Journal
37, 43. I do not express any view on the opinions advanced by these authors. Rather, my point
here is simply to demonstrate that the preoccupations central to the ‘counter-majoritarian prob-
lem’ are not the product of what one of my colleagues described as ‘American navel-gazing’ but
are present, albeit perhaps in a less concentrated form, in Australian legal literature and criti-
cism. Similar concerns have emerged in respect of the English legal system: see Robert Stevens,
The English Judges: Their Role in the Changing Constitution (2002) 131.
24 Michael Paulsen, ‘The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is’
(1994) 83 Georgetown Law Journal 217, 219; Robert Bork, Slouching towards Gomorrah:
Modern Liberalism and American Decline (1996) 117, although he has more recently expressed
scepticism about the prospect of solving the problems of judicial review through structural
realignment: Bork, Coercing Virtue, above n 22, 62; Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution
Away from the Courts (1999) 175.
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date judicial review by embracing a view of democracy that finds its strength in
deliberation.25 On one view, judicial review of legislative action is supported
largely on limited procedural grounds, as a means of ensuring that the delibera-
tive processes required by democracy have been satisfied in the creation of the
law.26 As such, the legitimate exercise of judicial power demands the employ-
ment of a minimalist methodology. Sunstein has taken the view that the adoption
of a minimalist approach — by which he means that judges decide cases as
narrowly and shallowly as possible, rather than laying down broad rules and
offering unnecessary dicta —
grants a certain latitude to other branches of government by allowing the demo-
cratic process room to adapt to future developments, to produce mutually ad-
vantageous compromises, and to add new information and perspectives to legal
problems.27
Thus the courts should defer to the more openly deliberative mechanisms of
democracy found in the other two branches of government — what Peters labels
a ‘policentric’ view of determining the judicial role.28
The case for judicial minimalism relies heavily upon an assessment of the
courts as relatively weak democratic institutions when viewed against a legisla-
tive chamber, such as Congress or our own Parliament.29 In fact, there is growing
dissatisfaction with this picture.30 The judicial system may, it is argued, provide
25 For recent criticism of this formulation of democracy generally, however, see Edward Rubin,
‘Getting Past Democracy’ (2001) 149 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 711, 714.
26 Cass Sunstein, ‘Interest Groups in American Public Law’ (1985) 38 Stanford Law Review 29,
58–9; Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law
and Democracy (William Rehg trans, 1996 ed) 274–7 [trans of: Faktizität und Geltung: Beiträge
zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des Demokratischen Rechtsstaats]; John Uhr, Deliberative
Democracy in Australia: The Changing Place of Parliament (1998) 231–3.
27 Cass Sunstein, ‘Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided’ (1996) 110 Harvard Law Review 6, 19
(citations omitted). Elsewhere, he expresses essentially the same idea by stating that ‘[f]rom the
standpoint of deliberative democracy, however, courts should avoid foreclosing the outcomes of
political deliberation if the preconditions for democratic deliberation have been met’: at 37.
However, it should be noted that Sunstein admits that ‘[m]inimalism is appropriate only in
certain contexts. It is hardly a sensible approach for all officials, or even all judges, all of the
time’ (at 28) and that ‘courts should provide spurs and prods when either democracy or delib-
eration is absent’ (at 37). For a more comprehensive explanation of Sunstein’s arguments for
judicial minimalism, see Cass Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996).
28 Christopher Peters, ‘Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism’ (2000) 100 Columbia Law Review
1454, 1457.
29 For a recent important example of this, see Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (1999).
Waldron rejects the negative perception which defenders of judicial review have tended to adopt
with respect to legislatures and the corresponding ‘naiveté’ with which the workings of the
judicial arm have been viewed: at 31–2. It is important to state that very few commentators
assert that the judicial arm possesses no democratic features. Indeed, Uhr has said that
the role of the deliberative assembly is not to act as the sole or even primary site of political
deliberation, which is a responsibility it shares with the two other political institutions of the
magistracy and the judiciary. … The relevant lesson here is that even under regimes of delib-
erative democracy it makes sense to think of modern legislatures as only one of a number of
sites for political deliberation …
Uhr, above n 26, 31.
30 For example, Dworkin writes:
In some circumstances … individual citizens may be able to exercise the moral responsibili-
ties of citizenship better when final decisions are removed from ordinary politics and assigned
to courts, whose decisions are meant to turn on principle, not on the weight of numbers or the
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a more perfect form of deliberative democracy than Sunstein and others have
been prepared to concede, in which case the arguments for a minimalist method
start to buckle. While Rawls’s championing of the United States Supreme Court
directly focuses upon his view of it as ‘the exemplar of public reason’,31 rather
than the ‘social or interactive aspect of deliberation’,32 other commentators have
recently sought to address this latter issue. In particular, Peters has argued that
the policentric bent of minimalist advocates downplays the inherent democratic
legitimacy of the adjudicative process.33 He finds that, even in the absence of
electoral checks upon accountability, public participation and the number of
issues represented ensures that while it ‘may be differently democratic … it is
inaccurate to say that adjudication is nondemocratic.’34 In order to overcome
lingering reservations about the lack of electoral control of the judiciary, Peters
argues that the quality of deliberation in the courts surpasses that of the political
realm. Nonetheless, while he discusses the features of the adversarial system —
the interchange of reasoned arguments, not dependent upon ‘self-interest or
force’, in a context far removed from the ‘glare of the public spotlight’ — he
does not, strangely, appear to stress the ability to accommodate dissent at the
point of adjudication as providing further support for his argument.35
Ironically, that recognition comes from a commentator who certainly does not
support Peters’s assessment of the judicial arm. In his examination of the
‘counter-conversationalism’ of the courts (which he equates with their demo-
balance of political influence … Although the political process that leads to a legislative deci-
sion may be of very high quality, it very often is not … Even when the debate is illuminating,
moreover, the majoritarian process encourages compromises that may subordinate important
issues of principle. Constitutional legal cases, by contrast, can and do provoke a widespread
public discussion that focuses on political morality … I put the suggestion that judicial review
may provide a superior kind of republican deliberation about some issues tentatively, as a pos-
sibility, because I do not believe that we have enough information for much confidence either
way.
Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (1996)
30–1. Cf Waldron, above n 29, 285–91.
31 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993) 231.
32 John Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations (2000) 15
(emphasis in original).
33 Peters, ‘Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism’, above n 28.
34 Ibid 1486 (emphasis in original). Though again, on this point, see above n 29.
35 Peters, ‘Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism’, above n 28, 1496–9. That he would be
sympathetic to the arguments advanced by Stack, however, may be discerned through reading
some of Peters’s more recent work about the use of participatory devices as an enhancement of
the legitimacy of majority rule: Christopher Peters, ‘Persuasion: A Model of Majoritarianism as
Adjudication’ (2001) 96 Northwestern University Law Review 1, 36–7. Nevertheless, Peters is
able to arrive at
a picture of the American judiciary — with the Supreme Court at its apex — as more than just
the handmaiden of deliberative democracy. The Court is an active and crucial participant in
the process of deliberative democracy. It is just as deliberative in its own way as the political
branches, and often it is more deliberative, especially with respect to individual rights. And it
is significantly democratic, too, although not majoritarian. The Court thus can be understood
as a coequal institution of deliberative democracy, with the emphasis on the deliberative com-
ponent.
Peters, ‘Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism’, above n 28, 1514 (emphasis in original). He
then proceeds to discuss the implications of this view for Sunstein’s call for judicial minimalism
— agreeing ultimately with procedural minimalism but rejecting it substantively.
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cratic responsiveness) vis-à-vis the political branches of government,36 Bennett
concludes that it is the former’s limited conversational abilities which underpin
‘the persistent sense of democratic “difficulty”’37 many commentators have with
the judicial arm. However, he identifies dissenting opinions, along with the use
of amicus curiae, as the features which come closest to redeeming this disability:
the robust contemporary tradition of dissenting and concurring opinions is an
important conversational phenomenon. A mix of opinions may provide conver-
sational satisfactions to a spectrum of those affected, less broadly appealing,
but nonetheless akin to the variegated talk in the political realm.38
In seeing dissent as a vehicle for wider ongoing community discussion,
Bennett has made a notable concession to the view that the work of the courts
may be suitably deliberative. This point certainly accords with the arguments and
impressions offered by Peters, Dworkin and Rawls. Indeed, they would seem
more ready to invest it with greater significance than Bennett does in the context
of his argument overall. But while this is important, seeing dissents only in this
light seems to have taken us away from the inherently democratic character of
dissenting opinions, as considered at the outset in the words of Justices Brennan
and Douglas. Certainly, minority judgments may be fodder for consumption in
public debate following a high profile case and in this way the court contributes
to wide and popular deliberation. Still, does the ability of its members to dissent
render the court itself an appropriately democratic institution?
Pettit suggests that a capacity for dissent confers significant democratic cre-
dentials upon a body with restricted membership.39 In describing the ideal of
deliberative democracy, Pettit identifies four constraints requiring satisfaction:
• The inclusive constraint — all members should be equally entitled to vote
on how to resolve certain collective issues, or bundles of issues, with
something less than a unanimous vote being sufficient to determine the
outcome.
• The judgmental constraint — before voting, members should deliberate on
the basis of presumptively common concerns about which resolution is to
be preferred.
36 Robert Bennett, ‘Counter-Conversationalism and the Sense of Difficulty’ (2001) 95 Northwest-
ern University Law Review 845, 853.
37 Ibid. Friedman is dismissive of this conclusion and indeed much of the framework upon which
the inquiry is held in the first place: Friedman, ‘The Counter-Majoritarian Problem’, above n 21,
945–50.
38 Bennett, above n 36, 886. Bennett essentially reiterates these arguments in respect of persistent
dissent and concludes that the ‘conversational function served by repetition of dissent may in
this way provide quite a plausible explanation not only of why repetition of dissent has flour-
ished, but of why any “lawlessness” involved seems largely to escape criticism, or indeed much
in the way of notice’: at 888.
39 Philip Pettit, ‘Deliberative Democracy and the Case for Depoliticising Government’ (2001) 24
University of New South Wales Law Journal 724. Pettit says (at 725):
Democracy is a decision-making process whereby individuals gain a part to play in the opera-
tion of a collective body. Democracy gives the members of an electorate a part to play in the
polity, but it also gives individuals a collective role in other, more restrictive contexts; for ex-
ample, politicians in a party, parliament or cabinet, shareholders or directors in a commercial
company, judges in a collegiate court.
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• The dialogical constraint — members should conduct this deliberation in
open and unforced dialogue with one another, whether in a centralised fo-
rum or in various decentralised contexts.
…
• The group-rationality constraint — people should take steps to ensure that
where their voting would lead to inconsistent or otherwise irrational poli-
cies, this is remedied and group rationality is ensured; if no remedy is fea-
sible, as with a large-scale electorate, then group decisions should not ex-
tend to policy matters.40
To what extent does the facility for judicial dissent ensure that courts meet this
ideal? Clearly, the inclusive constraint is satisfied in respect of most common
law courts and those which have had particular significance so far to this
discussion, the United States Supreme Court and the High Court of Australia.41
The second and third constraints are much harder to gauge due to the relatively
high degree of secrecy which surrounds the process of adjudication. This may be
starkly demonstrated through consideration of Amar’s assessment of a recent
term of the Supreme Court against this criteria:
The deliberative virtues of Supreme Court doctrine are less clear. … The cur-
rent Justices, for example, hold quick oral arguments and spend little time dis-
cussing each case in conference. Then they vote. Surprisingly meager meaning-
ful dialogue occurs thereafter. A tentative Court opinion will circulate and often
win a majority within days, before a dissent has even had a chance to circulate.
The dissent may be far more powerfully reasoned, but no matter. The votes are
already in. Rarely does a Justice change his or her vote after conference.42
Amar ascribes virtually no significance at all to the dissenting function — even
as an indication of deliberation having occurred, let alone as a contribution to an
ongoing deliberative process. His rejection of the latter is predicated upon the
combination of tactical and cultural adherence to precedent and the difficulties
caused by the unpredictability of changes in the Court’s composition. With
respect, Amar’s dismissal of any substantial deliberation seems a trifle hasty.
Whilst more is known about the conferencing procedures of the United States
Supreme Court than those of the High Court of Australia,43 the former is not so
transparent that Amar can actually offer any real support for his assertions.44 If
40 Ibid 725–8.
41 In respect of the latter, I am setting to one side the means of resolving deadlock through the use
of a casting vote by the Chief Justice as it is certainly an exception rather than the rule.
42 Akhil Amar, ‘Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine’ (2000) 114 Harvard Law Review 26,
39–40. Amar was writing in respect of the 1999 term of the Supreme Court.
43 See especially Del Dickson (ed), The Supreme Court in Conference (1940–1985): The Private
Discussions behind Nearly 300 Supreme Court Decisions (2001).
44 He merely builds upon those offered by Dorf in his earlier examination of Socratic deliberation
on the Supreme Court. This in turn presents problems: while Dorf is sceptical about how much
deliberation occurs, at the same time he admits that ideas are exchanged by a variety of means,
including circulation of draft dissents: Michael Dorf, ‘Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Delib-
eration’ (1998) 112 Harvard Law Review 4, 40. It seems that Dorf (but not necessarily Amar,
whose assertion is completely unqualified) expects deliberation to take a particular form —
essentially, face-to-face, Socratic style. I am not convinced that, absent this, it is possible to
deduce that the written work of the judges amounts to very little deliberation (see the sources
discussed in below n 45). By way of contrast to the speculative nature of these comments on the
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anything, there is a wealth of evidence which suggests that judges, at least on
that particular Court, have changed their views on numerous occasions in
response to the opinions of their colleagues.45 This has also been evident in
several notable High Court cases in recent years.46 In any event, this requirement
sets the bar too high. Deliberation does not require, nor is it exclusively evi-
denced by, consensus — the dissenting and concurring judgments may well
indicate that deliberation has occurred even though it did not lead to a change of
mind. The mere fact that judgments make reference to each other (which seems
to occur with healthy frequency) is adequate evidence of the deliberation spurred
on by separate opinion writing. In the absence of any incontrovertible proof to
the contrary, the best approach is to accept the claims made by courts that they
do employ processes designed to encourage deliberation amongst their members,
in addition to noting the high likelihood of this also occurring informally.47
Therefore, Pettit’s judgmental and dialogical constraints may also be said to be
present in judicial work.
The fourth constraint of ‘group-rationality’ was added by Pettit after consid-
ering a number of theoretical examples leading him to conclude that if a group
is to be true to the spirit of deliberative democracy, then it cannot be ruled ro-
botically by majority, issue-by-issue voting. If the group was to give complete
control to such majority voting, then, regardless of the rationality of its individ-
ual members, it would be likely to support collectively irrational policies.48
This constraint has direct relevance to the problems caused by multi-issue
litigation and shifting majorities. The lack of any mechanism to avoid inconsis-
tencies arising through the aggregation of judicial votes indicates a flaw in the
United States Supreme Court, see van Dijk’s insider view of the deliberations on the European
Court of Human Rights. Van Dijk states that ‘[t]hose who had expressed a view which was
provisionally shared by a majority seldom, if ever, allowed themselves to be convinced by a
draft dissenting opinion which was brought to their notice’: Pieter van Dijk, ‘Separate Opinions
in the Practice of the European Court of Human Rights during the Martens Era’ in W E Haak,
G J M Corstens and M I Veldt (eds), Martens Dissenting: The Separate Opinions of a European
Human Rights Judge (2000) 7, 12.
45 In addition to much anecdotal support for this contention, there are the significant volumes
produced by Schwartz that demonstrate this admirably: see Bernard Schwartz, The Unpublished
Opinions of the Warren Court (1985); Bernard Schwartz, The Unpublished Opinions of the
Burger Court (1990); Bernard Schwartz, The Unpublished Opinions of the Rehnquist Court
(1996). An illuminating empirical study of the Washington Supreme Court based on surveys of
clerks also tends to confirm that circulation of drafts plays a dominant role in the formation of
consensus over a number of other factors: Charles Sheldon, ‘The Incidence and Structure of
Dissensus on a State Supreme Court’ in Cornell Clayton and Howard Gillman (eds), Supreme
Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches (1999) 115, 125–8.
46 See below Part III(A). The evidence is confined mainly to that provided by the justices
themselves in the course of their opinions. Certainly, it is difficult to imagine books such as
those by Schwartz emerging in respect of the High Court of Australia, if only for the practical
problems of finding the material: see Graeme Powell, ‘Private Papers’ in Tony Blackshield,
Michael Coper and George Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Austra-
lia (2001) 558, 558–9.
47 See below Part II(B), which considers how dissent reflects upon the operation of a court as an
institution.
48 Pettit, above n 39, 728. This forms one of the supports for the argument which Pettit goes on to
develop — that the popular will of the majority needs to be checked by the ability of depoliti-
cised bodies to make decisions on matters of common interest.
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deliberative process as employed by Australian courts.49 As Pettit says, ‘the
decisions that the group takes should be ones that can be deliberatively defended.
Not only should they issue from reasoning, they should themselves satisfy the
demands of reason.’50
What verdict then may we form of the High Court as a democratic institution
on the basis of its quality of deliberation as evinced through its accommodation
of dissent? Discounting the possibility of noncompliance with Pettit’s judg-
mental and dialogical constraints as an occasional matter of practice, the most
serious failing lies in the difficulty of reconciling the destructiveness which
dissenting and concurring opinions may wreak upon institutional coherence with
the demand for deliberation to produce group-rationality. The frequent inability
of judgment delivery in seriatim to conform with this fourth constraint clearly
inhibits the capacity of courts employing this method to attain the ideal of
deliberative democracy as a matter of practice. However, we should not lose
sight of the fact that it is the dissenting opinion which enables compliance with
the first three of Pettit’s constraints. To the extent that courts even approach the
requisite level of deliberation to secure their democratic credentials under this
model, it is the long tradition of dissent which gets them there. This is the
context in which the remarks of earlier commentators asserting a link between
judicial dissent and the democratic standing of the courts should be taken.
Pettit acknowledged that ‘[d]eliberative democrats differ on which forums
should be democratised in the deliberative way’,51 and doubtless there is much
room for debate as to whether a court of last resort is amongst those institutions
which may properly be characterised in this way. Certainly, there is ample
evidence of deliberation in such bodies, but does this provide sufficient demo-
cratic legitimacy absent an element of representation? Although answering this
question is clearly beyond the scope of this inquiry, it is enough to stress the role
of dissenting judgments in even enabling such a question to be asked at all in
respect of the courts. If we accept all that is argued by Peters and others in
respect of the participatory link between the courts and the public, an acknowl-
edgment of the institutional deliberative value of dissenting opinions to which
Stack has referred (and to which arguments such as those of Amar pose no
serious challenge) must surely enhance the claim to democratic legitimacy of the
judicial arm. Whether this is so to such an extent that it ultimately secures that
legitimacy to the point of assuaging the concerns of those perplexed by the
counter-majoritarian difficulty and advocating judicial minimalism, need not be
49 It is important to note here that these problems of incoherency are ones to which a practice of in
seriatim judgment delivery is especially prone: Lynch, above n 3, 493. Thus, the United States
Supreme Court, for example, which has traditionally employed a different method of judgment
delivery, may well satisfy the group-rationality constraint since it largely avoids these difficul-
ties. However, the advent in 1990 of ‘doubleheaders or twins’ — that is, ‘two cases in which
there were two opinions announcing different (and somewhat contradictory) parts of the Court’s
ruling for two different majorities in each case’ (David O’Brien, ‘Institutional Norms and Su-
preme Court Opinions: On Reconsidering the Rise of Individual Opinions’ in Cornell Clayton
and Howard Gillman (eds), Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches
(1999) 91, 111) — means that the Court is no longer completely immune from group irrational-
ity.
50 Pettit, above n 39, 728.
51 Ibid 725.
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determined here.52 It is sufficient for these purposes to recognise the contribution
that a capacity for dissent can make towards that end and, conversely, the
additional objections to which judicial review would be exposed if it were
exercised by a court governed by compulsory unanimity.
B  Dissent and Judicial Process
Dissent provides three notable benefits to the judicial process. First, it enables
members of the judiciary to be individually free in expressing their views.
Second, there is much to suggest that the presence of dissent has a positive
impact upon the manner in which the majority opinions are drafted so that they
are both more precise in what is laid down and more comprehensive in what they
address. Third, hearing an opposing view can very often provide clarification of
the majority position for those attempting to understand what it signifies. These
aspects of how dissent affects the process of judging and opinion writing are the
focus of this part of the article.
The independence that dissent affords the judicial arm is not institutional in the
sense that it cossets the judiciary from the demands of the legislature or execu-
52 In leaving the field at this point, I am conscious of emulating Stack’s prudence: see above n 20.
Yet, what of those many courts which are not allowed a dissenting facility? In discussing the
‘increasing tendency towards publishing dissents’ in numerous European courts, but particularly
in Germany, Alder states that ‘debates about dissent have tracked the emergence of democracy’:
Alder, above n 1, 237. Alder is not necessarily doubting the staunchness of democracy to be
found in numerous civil law jurisdictions which possess a traditional aversion to judicial dissent.
Rather, while acknowledging that the possibility of judicial dissent reflects and reinforces the
value of freedom of speech and the democratic nature of a political settlement, its absence does
not, of itself, stand as an indelible stain upon those polities in question. It does, however, pose an
obvious impediment to the applicability of those justifications of judicial review which rely
upon the democratic, deliberative qualities of courts to other adjudicative bodies where dissent is
forbidden or discouraged. Placing the final courts of civil law countries to one side, the position
of international courts such as the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and the European
Court of Justice should be recognised as being subject to rather different considerations. There
are political sensitivities at stake in such multi-nation tribunals. As Alder says: ‘Arguments
against dissent have been raised most strongly in settings where confidence in the political
settlement or in the judicial process has been relatively low or uncertain’: at 244. It must be
added that international courts are less obviously connected to any one particular political out-
look, but are designed to fulfil overarching purposes. The capacity to dissent in such courts may
well depend in part upon the content of those purposes. The absence of opportunity to dissent in
the Privy Council until 1966 demonstrates this point. Prior to that time the Privy Council was a
powerful tool for control of the varied components of the British Empire. By 1966, the hierar-
chical days of the Empire had been superseded by the more cooperative notion of the Common-
wealth. The rationale for quelling dissent had faded to be replaced by political reasons for its
acknowledgment. This situation may be compared with the purposes surrounding the establish-
ment of the International Court of Justice. Hussain asserts that one of the primary reasons for
allowing dissent in this body was that:
If universality of international law is the main objective, then it is necessary that the main
forms of civilization and major legal systems other than the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental
do not lose their voice in the majority opinion, especially on important aspects of international
law.
Ijaz Hussain, Dissenting and Separate Opinions at the World Court (1984) 3. See also Alder,
above n 1, 234. By way of another example, consider the contrast in forbidding dissent in the
Court of Justice of the European Communities and allowing it in the European Court of Human
Rights: see Henry Schermers, ‘Separate Opinions’ in W E Haak, G J M Corstens and M I Veldt
(eds), Martens Dissenting: The Separate Opinions of a European Human Rights Judge (2000) 1,
2–4. The different goals of uniformity and universality go some way towards explaining the
acceptability of dissent in these international courts.
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tive. Rather, dissent enables judges to fulfil their role without the pressure of
having to submit themselves to a process designed to produce an artificial
unanimity. In short, it ensures their independence from their colleagues.53 Some
of the most revealing comments on the deficiencies of enforced unanimity were
those collected by Paterson in his interviews with Law Lords in the early
1980s.54 Based on their experience in the Privy Council, their Lordships raised
two converse objections to a process which demanded the production of a single
judgment to which all of those presiding put their names. The first was that a
weak ‘compromise judgment’ would result from a need to reflect the lowest
common denominator of consensus.55 The second criticism of such an approach
was that if the judgment was not an insipid settlement between diverse points of
view, then it was just as likely to be the result of one justice’s work rather than
that of the entire bench.56 It will be recalled that this second point was Jeffer-
son’s great fear for the practice which Marshall CJ attempted to establish in the
United States Supreme Court — an opinion ‘having been done in the dark it can
be proved on no one.’57
Both these objections to a denial of dissent readily appear valid. It is not at all
inconceivable that unanimity may be impossible to achieve in practice.58 In the
absence of real consensus, the first scenario must surely be the only way in
which a unanimous opinion can result. But while the court is spared the potential
of immediate loss of public confidence ensuing from a divided bench, it is
ironically weakened in its ability to state decisively and develop the law of the
jurisdiction. Over time, the public’s faith in the court is likely to diminish
anyway due to the lack of transparency in how its decisions are reached:
53 It is interesting that one of the arguments raised against dissenting opinions in the Permanent
Court at the Hague was that enforced unanimity would be more effective in freeing the judges
from the pressure to be seen to cast their vote for their home country: Hussain, above n 52, 19.
The considerations governing the procedures in international courts are frequently quite different
from those in respect of national courts. This particular argument is inapplicable to the High
Court of Australia because judges are not appointed to it upon a representative basis. However,
this point is of much more force in respect of, for example, the Supreme Court of Canada which
does indeed aim at some degree of regional representation: see Bora Laskin, ‘The Supreme
Court of Canada: A Final Court of and for Canadians’ (1951) 29 Canadian Bar Review 1038,
1041–2.
54 Alan Paterson, The Law Lords (1982) 98–9.
55 Lord Pearce, quoted in ibid 99. See L’Heureux-Dubé, above n 1, 514:
In fact, in my view, one creates a false dichotomy by equating unanimous opinions with clar-
ity and authority, while associating dissenting opinions with incoherence. Where there is pro-
found disagreement among judges, the law itself is the greatest beneficiary of dissenting
opinions: instead of sacrificing lucidity to an overriding need to accommodate diverging
views, judges may focus their efforts on the logical and persuasive justification of their own
understanding of the law, whether it be a minority or majority of one.
Most commentary is in this vein. For a generally sceptical perspective on the benefits of dissent
to the quality of judgments, see Theo ten Kate, ‘Dissenting Opinion: A Brief Background
Sketch’ in W E Haak, G J M Corstens and M I Veldt (eds), Martens Dissenting: The Separate
Opinions of a European Human Rights Judge (2000) 13, 14–15.
56 Paterson, above n 54, 99.
57 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson, 12 June 1823 in Levin, above n 4, 518.
58 ‘Disagreement on the law or its proper application nowadays is almost universally admitted to
be inevitable some of the time’: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, ‘Remarks on Writing Separately’
(1990) 65 Washington Law Review 133, 136. See also Sheldon, above n 45, 116–17.
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what must ultimately sustain the court in public confidence is the character and
independence of the judges. … while it may be regrettable that they cannot al-
ways agree, it is better that their independence should be maintained and rec-
ognized than that unanimity could be secured through its sacrifice.59
On the other hand, where a base level of agreement does exist it may be all too
tempting for one justice to take the reins of writing the opinion and thus exercise
undue individual influence on the shape of the law.
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé has declared that a denial of individual judicial ex-
pression ‘creates a situation entirely antithetical to the Canadian conception of
the role of the impartial and openminded judge.’60 The same must hold true in
respect of Australian judges.61 The ability to dissent relieves their Honours of the
pressure to conform to views they do not actually hold and ensures that they can
fulfil the promises contained within their judicial oath.62 This level of individual
independence might be perceived as placing a strain on the collegiality of the
court — and may thus be harmful to its overall operations. Justice Brennan
admitted that ‘[v]ery real tensions sometimes emerge when one confronts a
colleague with a dissent. After all, collegiality is important; unanimity does have
value; feelings must be respected.’63 Yet arguments have been advanced by
others that admitting the different viewpoints within a court provides a safety
valve for the much greater strains which would otherwise develop. Despite the
occasional snideness which is to be found amongst separate judgments delivered
in a case, less animosity is said to accrue from majoritarian decision-making than
from enforced unanimity.64 Flanders warns against using dissents ‘as some type
of crude barometer to measure the lack of collegiality on an appellate court.’65
The extent to which the judicial process is affected by sour personal relations66
between justices can only marginally be attributed to an ability to dissent.67 A
59 Charles Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States — Its Foundation, Methods and
Achievements: An Interpretation (1928) 67–8. See also Fuld, above n 8, 927.
60 L’Heureux-Dubé, above n 1, 513.
61 See Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth v St Helens Farm (ACT) Pty Ltd (1980)
146 CLR 336, 387 (Murphy J).
62 On the significance of the judicial oath to High Court judges, see Justice John Toohey,
‘“Without Fear or Favour, Affection or Ill-Will”: The Role of Courts in the Community’ (1999)
28 University of Western Australia Law Review 1, 2.
63 Brennan, above n 1, 429 (emphasis in original). On the dysfunction caused by rampant
individualism on the High Court during the early years of Latham CJ’s tenure, see Clem Lloyd,
‘Not Peace but a Sword! — The High Court under J G Latham’ (1987) 11 Adelaide Law Review
175, 178–87.
64 Alder, above n 1, 240; L’Heureux-Dubé, above n 1, 513.
65 Flanders, above n 1, 403.
66 See Amelia Simpson and Troy Simpson, ‘Personal Relations’ in Tony Blackshield, Michael
Coper and George Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia (2001)
528, 528–31.
67 Sir Anthony Mason has expressed the view that, in his experience, tensions on the High Court
were most pronounced over disagreements as to the use of precedent in matters of constitutional
interpretation and this was frequently evidenced in ‘strongly expressed judgments’, often dis-
senting in nature: Sir Anthony Mason, ‘Personal Relations: A Personal Reflection’ in Tony
Blackshield, Michael Coper and George Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High
Court of Australia (2001) 531, 532. However, the ability to dissent is incidental, rather than
central, to an actual disagreement as to the value of any particular precedent. The relationship
between precedent and dissent will be considered in below Part IV.
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dissenting judgment is merely the public manifestation of an existing disagree-
ment. Disharmony in the court is not avoided by a ban on expressing dissent —
if anything, that simply raises the stakes and increases the pressure within.
As well as assisting to free the judicial process from constraints upon its inde-
pendence, the ability to dissent also results in clear benefits to the method of
opinion writing. To some extent these two overlap, as evidenced by the effect of
enforced unanimity upon Privy Council judgments. However, while the stultify-
ing impact upon the quality of judgments caused by a lack of judicial independ-
ence has been addressed, the positive consequences of allowing dissent must still
be considered. In simple terms, a dissent offers a competing viewpoint and
competition is conducive to greater efficiency or, in this context, better quality.68
The laziness and lack of accountability which Jefferson feared in the United
States Supreme Court are threatened when the cloak of unanimity is cast aside.
Allegations along those lines may still be levelled against judges when delivery
of seriatim opinions is the norm (no matter how unfairly).69 But, at least for
those outside the inner sanctum, the dynamics between their Honours will be
easier to gauge for these features.
If the judges in consensus are faced not with assembling an enforced tepid
agreement with their colleagues, but instead with a challenge to their position by
a published dissenting opinion, then it is clear that the processes of the court are
dramatically altered. The focus is not upon writing a judgment to which every-
one can offer base approval, but rather upon producing an opinion which
withstands the criticisms made of it, expressly or by implication, by a dissent. As
Flanders points out:
because the reasoning of the majority and any dissents will inevitably be com-
pared and judgments will be rendered concerning which is the better-reasoned
or the best solution to the problem posed by the case, the filing of a dissent also
means that the intellectual stakes of the case, as well as its potential media in-
terest, have also increased for all concerned.70
In such circumstances, the authors of all opinions will be striving to make theirs
the most compelling.71
68 As Sir Hersch Lauterpacht said, dissent is ‘a powerful stimulus to the maximum effort of which
a tribunal is capable’: Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the
International Court (1958) 66–7. See also Alder, above n 1, 240; Brennan, above n 1, 435; Fuld,
above n 8, 927; Hussain, above n 52, 3; L’Heureux-Dubé, above n 1, 515; R Moorhead, ‘Con-
curring and Dissenting Opinions’ (1952) 38 American Bar Association Journal 821, 823; Justice
Antonin Scalia, ‘The Dissenting Opinion’ (1994) Journal of Supreme Court History 33, 41;
Edward Voss, ‘Dissent: Sign of a Healthy Court’ (1992) 24 Arizona State Law Journal 643,
655–7. In many respects, the ensuing discussion deals with issues addressed earlier in the article
concerned with the quality of deliberation in the judicial process.
69 Starke J dubbed Evatt and McTiernan JJ ‘the parrots’ on account of his perception that they
always followed the lead of Dixon J: Lloyd, above n 63, 181. In his turn, Dixon J took the view
that Williams and Webb JJ were ‘passengers’: Simpson and Simpson, above n 66, 530.
70 Flanders, above n 1, 403. Kadzielski and Kunda agree with Flanders but state that ‘[w]hile this
may be one of the effects of a dissent it can hardly be considered a motive for dissenting. A
judge is not going to dissent in order to strengthen the authority of a decision with which he
disagrees’: Mark Kadzielski and Robert Kunda, ‘The Unmaking of Judicial Consensus in the
1930s: An Historical Analysis’ (1983) 15 University of West Los Angeles Law Review 43, 54–5.
71 Such is the effectiveness of dissenting judgments as a means of exposing weaknesses in majority
opinions, that the former Attorney-General has cited them as one factor justifying his disinclina-
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Thinking of dissents as providing a competitive impetus to the judgment
writing process is one side of the matter. Different judgments do not just react to
each other: at the immediate stage of writing, they can interact with each other.
The drafting of dissents for circulation amongst the court creates a dialogue
which can lead to the incorporation of some of the ideas of a dissentient in the
opinion of the majority.72 Interestingly, Paterson suggests that the author may
withdraw the draft dissent once this process is completed and there is no further
influence to be exerted upon the majority.73 Certainly, this would seem to depend
upon how strongly the individual justice feels about the correctness of his or her
views and how important he or she perceives the issue to be. Nonetheless, the
suggestion is not highly surprising given the arguments in favour of the exercise
of judicial self-restraint, canvassed in Part III of this article. The extent to which
this occurs in the High Court of Australia must, of course, be largely a matter of
speculation, although there have been instances where a dissenting view is
published and then recanted from in subsequent cases to provide concurrence —
a curious example of judicial restraint.74
It must be admitted that the value of dissent at this stage is largely dependent
upon the institutional processes, if any, that exist for the court in question to
manage its work. In the United States Supreme Court, the practice of delivering
an opinion ‘for the Court’ necessitates early identification of a Justice’s stance
on the problem at hand. The formal conferencing procedure adopted by that body
also provides a forum in which this information will be declared.75 However, in
courts delivering judgments in seriatim and without any institutionalised process
of communication, dissents will have less impact upon opinion writing. In such
courts, the justices are not engaged in drafting majority and minority opinions as
part of a dialogue — they are simply writing their own opinions and dispatching
these into the ether without much thought for their ultimate status.76 As extrapo-
lated elsewhere, dissent is a relational concept and no judgment is inherently
dissenting.77 Nonetheless, it should be recognised that the eventual status of a
tion to defend the judiciary from external attack: ‘It is very difficult to see what defending the
court would mean when some of its most articulate critics are amongst its members’: Daryl
Williams, ‘The Role of the Attorney-General’ (2002) 13 Public Law Review 252, 260.
72 Chief Justice Rehnquist has written that
not only those who agree with a position that is ably expounded benefit from the exposition;
so do those who end up disagreeing with the position. By this process of elucidation through
criticism and disagreement, the first draft of a prevailing opinion may be refined and revised
by the input of others to make a better product than any solo writing would have been.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, ‘Foreword’ in E Rosenkranz and Bernard Schwartz (eds),
Reason and Passion: Justice Brennan’s Enduring Influence (1997) 11, 11. Cf Amar, above n 42,
40.
73 Paterson, above n 54, 100–1.
74 See below Part III(A).
75 Indeed, the present Chief Justice of that Court views this as the ‘true purpose’ of the practice:
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: How It Was, How It Is (1987) 294–5.
76 Stephen J is attributed as saying, ‘its [sic] not a matter of great zeal and enthusiasm that my view
should prevail. [If it] doesn’t happen to be the majority view, so be it’: Michael Coper, Encoun-
ters with the Australian Constitution (1987) 152.
77 Lynch, above n 3. In attempting to understand this less formal system, an American commenta-
tor suggested:
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judgment can become apparent earlier or later depending upon the procedures
followed by the justices of the court. If the dissenting judgment comes too late to
make a difference to the drafting of the majority opinions then this particular
function of dissent is not exploited.
The conferencing procedures of courts other than the United States Supreme
Court may be less established or at least less appreciated by observers, but they
do exist in some form. Paterson’s examination of the House of Lords 20 years
ago meticulously detailed the extent of both formal and informal interaction
among the Law Lords.78 The High Court has had a chequered history in this
respect.79 In 1997, Justice Kirby expressed regret that the High Court did not
‘have anything like’ the system of conferencing and case assignment employed
in the United States Supreme Court.80 His hope that ‘something like that will
come in time’81 was fulfilled soon after when, ‘upon the initiative of Chief
Justice Gleeson, a new series of regular meetings of the Justices … com-
menced.’82 Justice Callinan has recently confirmed that these conferencing
techniques have been maintained.83 Similar efforts to achieve such interaction in
the past met with less success. Barwick CJ’s attempt to institute formal confer-
ences collapsed in the face of opposition from his individualistic colleagues.
However, although the Court’s disunity during this period has been highlighted
and analysed by commentators,84 its members were at least still communicating
with each other, if not actively seeking to build upon consensus.85 The personal
animosity infecting the Latham Court, on the other hand, meant that for substan-
‘The dissent’ was unnecessary in English courts, in which opinions were presented seriatim.
Each law lord would orally express his individual opinion. There was no need to ‘dissent’ be-
cause each jurist, in turn, expressed his own opinion in the case. Any disagreement was mani-
fest; it did not need to be called a ‘dissent’.
Voss, above n 68, 644–5 (citations omitted).
78 Paterson, above n 54, 89–98.
79 Troy Simpson, ‘Conferences’ in Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper and George Williams (eds),
The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia (2001) 130, 130–3.
80 Justice Michael Kirby, ‘What Is It Really Like to Be a Justice of the High Court of Australia? A
Conversation between Law Students and Justice Kirby’ (1997) 19 Sydney Law Review 514, 517.
81 Ibid.
82 See High Court of Australia, Annual Report: 1998–99 (1999) 5. The report states (at 5):
In the past, there has always been informal discussion on such matters. The new series of
meetings has formalized the arrangements to a greater extent and provided the occasion for the
review of current thinking of the Justices concerning the cases reserved for decision. … The
discussions will not always secure agreement between the Justices and this is not their pur-
pose. Even where important differences exist, discussion can help to clarify and refine opin-
ions and reasoning.
83 The Court engages in both ‘a short conference after an appeal has been heard’ and a subsequent
‘more formal judgments meeting’: Justice Ian Callinan, ‘Law and Literature’ (2001) 21 Austra-
lian Bar Review 265, 266.
84 See Marr, above n 7, 233; G P J McGinley, ‘The Search for Unity: The Impact of Consensus
Seeking Procedures in Appellate Courts’ (1987) 11 Adelaide Law Review 203, 207–9; Michael
Sexton, Uncertain Justice: Inside Australia’s Legal System (2000) 15.
85 As Marr reports:
Consultation between the judges at this stage of the process depended on friendship, speciality
and geography. … Each decision went to Barwick. The Chief Justice’s staff photocopied the
judgments, entered them in the schedule of judgments in hand, and circulated a copy to each
of the judges sitting on the case.
Marr, above n 7, 222.
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tial periods of time even this was not occurring. This is a good example of a
court so dysfunctional that the use of dissent as a means of improving the quality
of written judgments was lost. Starke J ‘refused to have any consultation with
Evatt, to exchange reasons for judgments and draft judgments with him, or even
to supply him with final judgments.’86 Starke J’s uncooperative behaviour was
not always exclusively applied in respect of Evatt J and, not surprisingly, Evatt J
applied reciprocal sanctions against Starke J. Nonetheless, the Latham Court
must be seen as an extreme example, where not even informal opportunities to
liaise were utilised.87 On the whole, it seems reasonable to presume that some
basic level of discussion takes place in a collective decision-making body, in
which case draft dissenting judgments may be able to improve the quality of
majority opinions.
The concept of a dialogue between judgments leads us to the final function
which dissents may perform in the enhancement of a court’s work. It has been
suggested that the knowledge that some justices are intending to dissent should
ideally stimulate greater care and attention in the drafting of opinions. Even so,
the reasoning of the majority camp may be difficult to grasp. This may be for a
variety of reasons, but two spring readily to mind: the majority opinion may be
poorly constructed and justified; or the majority view may be a composite of
different opinions whose combined effect is to cloud the clarity of the decision as
a whole. In either situation, a better appreciation of the import of the majority
view may be achieved after considering a dissent — making it clear what the
majority does not stand for by providing a useful contrast.88 In his exhortations
to Johnson J, Thomas Jefferson was keen to highlight the benefits of seriatim
opinions beyond their democratic function. In praising the method of the English
judiciary, he was quick to note ‘the light which their separate arguments threw on
the subject, and the instruction communicated by their several modes of reason-
ing’.89 By contrast, the lone voice of unanimity can often simply provoke further
questions which, in the absence of an illuminating dissent, require clarification in
later decisions.90
86 Lloyd, above n 63, 182.
87 ‘The refusal by a Justice to contribute to the deliberations of his colleagues was an extraordinary
and exceptional step. … With this exception, friction between members of the Court does not
appear to have significantly affected the Court’s work’: Mason, ‘Personal Relations’,
above n 67, 532.
88 Matthew Bergman, ‘Dissent in the Judicial Process: Discord in Service of Harmony’ (1991) 68
Denver University Law Review 79, 85–6. See also Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Proce-
dure of the International Court of Justice (1986) vol 1, 1–2.
89 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson, 27 October 1822 in Levin above n 4, 513.
90 A recent example of this in the High Court of Australia was the unanimous decision in
Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, which sought to resolve
much uncertainty in respect of the constitutionally implied freedom of speech by subsuming or
explaining ‘the various formulations offered by different members of the Court in earlier judg-
ments. However, for that very reason, there may be room for disagreement as to precisely how
the Lange test is to be applied’: Tony Blackshield and George Williams, Australian Constitu-
tional Law and Theory: Commentary & Materials (3rd ed, 2002) 1192.
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C  Dissent and the Law’s Development
Having considered the political significance of dissent and its potential to
contribute to the process of judgment writing, the final broad function to be
addressed looks to the future — how does dissent assist in the development of
legal principle? In addressing this issue, one cannot avoid quoting Hughes,
whose distinctive lyricism has never quite been surpassed by subsequent
commentators and has been echoed by the High Court of Australia:
A dissent in a court of last resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law,
to the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct
the error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to have been be-
trayed.91
Its ubiquity aside, Hughes’s portrayal of dissent remains striking for the ro-
manticism with which it imbues American discussions of dissent. It is in this
vein that the notion of dissent as prophecy has taken hold.92 It seems rather odd
that the idea of a dissenting judge as a ‘prophet with honor’ should gain currency
in a legal culture which provided fertile ground for the growth of the realist,
critical legal studies and jurimetrics movements. But the danger of adopting this
sobriquet is that it obscures the dynamic role which dissent can play in achieving
change in the law. Lively’s description of dissents may be short on soaring
expression, but it displays a keener awareness of their function: ‘dissents
facilitate the law’s development while providing a linkage that establishes a
source of continuity.’93 To describe dissents as ‘foreshadowing’94 or ‘prescient’95
speaks more to a judge being ahead of his or her time than talk of prophecy,
which tends to overly mystify the judicial process and adopt a degree of fatalism
towards movement in the law.96 In any case, these labels may only be applied
91 Hughes, above n 59. See also Federation Insurance Ltd v Wasson (1987) 163 CLR 303, where
Mason CJ, Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ said that ‘[a] dissenting judge will often see his or
her judgment as an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, waiting for judges in future cases to
discover its wisdom’: at 314.
92 Alan Barth may not have been the initiator of the catchphrase ‘prophet with honour’ but he can
fairly take credit for its widespread use in American legal circles: see Barth, above n 2. Two
earlier instances employing prophecy as a descriptor can be cited. Jackson stated that the dis-
senter ‘may be the prophet whose heresy of today becomes the dogma of tomorrow’: Percival
Jackson, Dissent in the Supreme Court: A Chronology (1969) 3. Felix Frankfurter said that
Holmes J’s dissents ‘record prophecy and shape history’: Felix Frankfurter, ‘Mr Justice Holmes
and the Constitution: A Review of His Twenty-Five Years on the Supreme Court’ (1927) 41
Harvard Law Review 121, 162.
93 Donald Lively, Foreshadows of the Law: Supreme Court Dissents and Constitutional Develop-
ment (1992) xi.
94 Ibid.
95 Michael Coper and George Williams (eds), Justice Lionel Murphy: Influential or Merely
Prescient? (1997).
96 It is curious to see some commentators marry the prophetic and active roles of dissent in respect
of change in the law. This is done in the quote from Frankfurter, above n 92. More recently
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé has said that ‘dissenting opinions are not only prophetic, but they are
also an invitation for dialogue about the law’s development in these areas’: L’Heureux-Dubé,
above n 1, 508. These quotes reveal the difficulty in using prophecy to describe something
which may actually be trying to achieve change — unless one is content with the notion of a
self-fulfilling prophecy.
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with the benefit of hindsight after such time as the dissent has itself been a factor
in stimulating legal change.
Dissent as enabling dialogue was discussed earlier in respect of the interaction
between the justices sitting on a particular case. The concept of dialogue is again
useful here in exploring the way in which dissent promotes evolution of the law,
though in this instance the discourse occurs over time and may involve parties
external to the court.97 The ‘brooding spirit of the law’ is to be found in the
minds of commentators, legislatures and later manifestations of the court. It is
clear, for the various reasons considered in the previous section, that evaluating
the court’s work is made easier in cases where there are dissenting opinions.
Obviously, commentators, academic or otherwise, do not directly develop the
law, but they can certainly seek to influence it. This occurs not infrequently
through championing of a dissent. Parliamentary reaction to a decision which it
regards as unsatisfactory may have two uses for a dissenting view given voice in
the case. First, a division in the bench may be said to provide a degree of
political justification for legislative interference with the court’s settlement of the
law. Second, dissenting opinions may provide Parliament with material that
guides the form of its response to the decision reached by the court.98
It is perhaps to future sittings of the court, however, that dissent has most
relevance in shaping the law — certainly this must be true in respect of constitu-
97 Blackshield states that
patterns of High Court growth and change involve complex interaction among all seven mem-
bers of the Court: and while some of this interaction involves informal discussion or exchange
of draft judgments, its main channel is the public dialogue conducted in the published judg-
ments themselves.
Tony Blackshield, ‘Introduction’ in Tony Blackshield et al (eds), The Judgments of Justice
Lionel Murphy (1986) xiii, xviii.
98 For discussion of an early example of this, see generally George Brown, ‘A Dissenting Opinion
of Mr Justice Story Enacted as Law within Thirty-Six Days’ (1940) 26 Virginia Law Review
759. This phenomenon — that of a ‘dialogue’ between the two arms of government — has
recently drawn a good deal of commentary in Canada: see generally Kent Roach, The Supreme
Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue (2001). For example, the dissenting
view of L’Heureux-Dubé J in R v O’Connor [1995] 4 SCR 411 was subsequently enshrined in
the Canadian Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c 46 through legislative amendment and then approved
by the Court in the case of R v Mills [1999] 3 SCR 668. But in rejecting the dialogue model of
the relationship between the judiciary and legislature stimulated by the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, pt 1 of the Constitution Act 1982, being sch B to the Canada Act 1982
(UK) c 11, Manfredi and Kelly say of these cases that ‘the response by the Parliament of Canada
can only be considered as legislative compliance that borders on Charter ventriloquism’: Chris-
topher Manfredi and James Kelly, ‘Dialogue, Deference and Restraint: Judicial Independence
and Trial Procedures’ (2001) 64 Saskatchewan Law Review 323, 345. While the suggestion of
these authors of an impaired equality underlying the dialogue between the courts and Parliament
may have some credence, this episode should not lose its broader significance for the purposes
of this article — the potential impact of dissents outside the court so as to assist change. How-
ever, this potential is clearly limited in the area of constitutional law.
An Australian example of dialogue between the High Court and Parliament where dissenting
opinions seem to have been influential is the legislative amendments made to the Telecommuni-
cations (Interception) Act 1979 (Cth) in the wake of the 3:2 split in Hilton v Wells (1985) 157
CLR 57 over the validity of judges issuing warrants for telephone tapping. The amendments
appeared to be passed with the aim of addressing the concerns of the dissenters in that case,
Mason CJ and Deane J. By the time the issue rose again for consideration in Grollo v Palmer
(1995) 184 CLR 348, Mason CJ had retired but Deane J was seemingly satisfied with the change
in the law.
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tional law.99 The consolation for the judge whose views have not triumphed on
the day is the hope that they may be later revived and vindicated. This is most
likely what Hughes had in mind when he spoke of ‘the brooding spirit of the
law’. Again though, we find that Thomas Jefferson appreciated this aspect of
dissent well before others did: ‘It sometimes happened too that when there were
three opinions against one, the reasoning of the one was so much the most
cogent as to become afterwards the law of the land.’100
The ability of dissent to foster change in the law has been recognised almost
universally,101 although some commentators place different emphasis upon
negative side-effects which may accrue as a result of the practice.102 It is
surprising, therefore, to find a lone voice of doubt on this score. Kadzielski and
Kunda in their examination of ballooning dissent rates in several American
courts during the 1930s make the following statement:
Some decisions are overruled a short time after they emerge; occasionally a
court will reverse itself on rehearing. Whether any of these is the result of a dis-
senter’s convincing his colleagues that they are wrong through his dissent is
doubtful. That a dissent would be written for such an unlikely event seems even
more unlikely. … Conservative judges as well as liberal ones realize that a de-
cision can be overruled. The liberal judges as well as conservative ones realize
that it is unlikely to happen unless greatly changed conditions or wisdom
emerge. Both groups cast dissenting votes. It does not seem that either group
uses dissents in order to promote changes in the law.103
This is a fairly startling claim, which the authors seek to justify by citing two
examples — the best known being that of the dissenting judgment of Harlan J in
Plessy v Ferguson.104 Kadzielski and Kunda argue first that the tone of a dissent
rarely looks forward, but instead is defeatist:
99 Though in respect of the High Court of Australia this is yet to be the subject of in-depth study.
100 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson, 27 October 1822 in Levin, above n 4,
513–15.
101 Alder, above n 1, 241; Bader Ginsburg, above n 58, 143–5; Bergman, above n 88, 82–5;
Brennan, above n 1, 430–1; Toni Ellington, ‘Ruth Bader Ginsburg and John Marshall Harlan: A
Justice and Her Hero’ (1998) 20 University of Hawaii Law Review 797, 820–1, 824–32;
Flanders, above n 1, 410–14; Fuld, above n 8, 928; Gaffney, above n 1, 590; Hussain,
above n 52, 7, 24; Ken Kimura, ‘A Legitimacy Model for the Interpretation of Plurality Deci-
sions’ (1992) 77 Cornell Law Review 1593; Kirby, above n 23, 17; Anita Krishnakumar, ‘On the
Evolution of the Canonical Dissent’ (2000) 52 Rutgers Law Review 781, 788–805; Jacob Lashly
and Paul Rava, ‘The Supreme Court Dissents’ (1943) 28 Washington University Law Quarterly
191, 191–2; L’Heureux-Dubé, above n 1, 504–9; Little, above n 1, 687; Mimi Liu, ‘A “Prophet
with Honour”: An Examination of the Gender Equality Jurisprudence of Madam Justice Claire
L’Heureux-Dubé of the Supreme Court of Canada’ (2000) 25 Queen’s Law Journal 417, 475–8;
Nadelmann, above n 68, 430–2; Richard Primus, ‘Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent’
(1998) 48 Duke Law Journal 243; Schermers, above n 52, 2, 5; Thomas Shea, ‘The Great Dis-
senters: Parallel Currents in Holmes and Scalia’ (1997) 67 Mississippi Law Journal 397;
Sheldon, above n 45, 116; Voss, above n 68, 657–9; Fisher v Minister of Public Safety and
Immigration [1998] AC 673, 686 (Lord Steyn).
102 See below Part III.
103 Kadzielski and Kunda, above n 70, 53, 55. The only hint of support I can find in other literature
for this view is Justice Scalia’s acknowledgment that dissenting opinions can ‘help to change the
law’ — he concludes that this is ‘most common in the decisions of intermediate appellate tribu-
nals’ and is rare in the Supreme Court: Scalia, above n 68, 36–7.
104 163 US 537 (1896) (‘Plessy’). This case involved a challenge to one of the so-called ‘Jim Crow’
laws of the South — a Louisiana statute which required railway companies to provide ‘equal but
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He [Harlan J] was definitely accepting the finality of the decision with which
he disagreed under the circumstances of the times. The dissent could hardly
have been intended to persuade the Court to change its mind in the immediate
future; if change was to be forthcoming, there would be no need to atone.105
This seems an odd observation to make because it denies that a number of
functions are fulfilled in all opinion writing. While resolution of the matter
before the court is the paramount task, it is understandable, especially in courts
of last resort, that judgments are assembled with an eye on the future. Regret for
the immediate result need not obliterate the hope, even unexpressed, that
subsequent like cases will meet with a different reception.
The second argument used to support this contention goes even more to the
question of a developmental function of dissent. Essentially, Kadzielski and
Kunda take the view that courts, when overruling majority decisions, seldom
seem to place reliance upon dissents in order to do so. In relation to Plessy, they
say:
Although the precise holding about segregation on railroad cars to which Jus-
tice Harlan objected has since been overruled, the language of what is probably
the most famous dissenting opinion ever written has not become accepted
law.106
While this is certainly true and the Supreme Court in Brown v Board of Edu-
cation of Topeka107 did not make reference to Harlan J’s opinion, one should be
careful in dismissing its impact. The persuasive pull of particular judgments (and
for that matter, external commentary) may be an extraordinarily subtle force.
Barth’s appreciation of the often abstruse influence of dissents is demonstrated
by his view of the same material:
It can hardly be said that the vision and fire of Harlan’s dissenting opinion
turned the Court round, as though in 1954 that dissent was suddenly read with
understanding for the first time. Yet it can hardly be said, either, that his vision
and fire were altogether without effect upon succeeding judges. Every time
members of the Supreme Court were called upon to decide a case entailing ra-
cial segregation, they were obliged to reread the fatuous words of Justice
Brown and to be reminded by Justice Harlan’s stinging refutation that the deci-
sion was juridically — and ethically — wrong.108
Attempts to verify or quantify the impact of dissenting opinions upon subse-
quent development of the law should be wary of the overly simple analysis
which Kadzielski and Kunda have applied in their consideration of Harlan J’s
separate accommodations’ for white and coloured passengers. A majority of the United States
Supreme Court found that the segregationist law was consistent with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Such laws eventually met their end at the hands of a unanimous Supreme Court decision
delivered almost 60 years later: Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, 347 US 483 (1954).
105 Kadzielski and Kunda, above n 70, 56. Contrast this with Bergman’s description of Harlan J’s
dissent as ‘an eloquent appeal to future generations’: Bergman, above n 88, 83.
106 Kadzielski and Kunda, above n 70, 56.
107 347 US 483 (1954).
108 Barth, above n 2, 52–3.
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judgment in Plessy.109 The formal recognition and vindication of an earlier
dissent by a court alone will not present the extent to which such judgments have
effect. For a pertinent local example, Justice Kirby has expressed the view that
several innovative approaches employed by Murphy J during his 11 years on the
High Court of Australia have gained greater acceptance, albeit without due
acknowledgment, in the years since his death.110 Only by a substantive examina-
tion of the developing jurisprudence of a court can an accurate assessment of the
impact of the past be reached.111
Before concluding this section, it should be made clear that the message of a
dissenter to his or her court need not necessarily advocate progression of the law.
Dissent can just as effectively be used to contain the impact of new principles.
As Lord Radcliffe told Paterson, dissent ‘does enable you to try to limit what you
regard as an unsatisfactory line by some reasoned and carefully worked out
contribution of your own.’112 The idea of dissent as a subtly conservative
influence on a progressive court is not how we tend to think dissenters are
typically regarded, though it may be far more the norm.113 Once again, a
propensity to talk of prophets and ‘Great Dissenters’ can lead to a blinkered view
of the pervasive and diverse nature of dissent in practice.114
109 The reader may be asking, so what significance do Kadzielski and Kunda, above n 70, ascribe to
Harlan J’s dissent? The answer is (at 57):
Justice Harlan was right in doing what is often said it is nearly impossible to do, that is, writ-
ing history as the events occur rather than writing from a perspective of time. This is the pri-
mary motivation for such a dissent: it can forever stand as a monument to what the dissenting
judge felt at the time to be right, which may be illuminated later by the light of history, or
which at least can stand as a symbol to some greater power of right and wrong than the law of
the land.
Kadzielski and Kunda, it would seem, are strongly advocating a prophetic role for the dissenting
judgment, but unlike those authors cited above at nn 92 and 96, they do not see this function as
combined with a capacity to contribute actively to change, certainly not within the court itself.
As is clear from that earlier footnote, I am sceptical of something being simultaneously charac-
terised as prophetic and dynamic. Unlike Kadzielski and Kunda, I see the ‘dissent as prophecy’
paradigm unhelpful and dispensable.
110 Justice Michael Kirby, ‘Lionel Murphy and the Power of Ideas’ (1993) 18 Alternative Law
Journal 253, 254. The degree of subsequent influence of Murphy J’s judgments is the central
inquiry in Coper and Williams, Justice Lionel Murphy, above n 95.
111 In respect of the impact of Murphy J, Blackshield stressed that ‘even to assess his contribution,
we would need to trace it through patterns of accommodation and rejection extending over a
series of cases, and indeed over decades to come’: Blackshield, above n 97, xviii (emphasis in
original).
112 Paterson, above n 54, 101.
113 An example of this in the High Court is the influence of the dissentients (notably Dawson and
McHugh JJ) in the freedom of speech cases of the 1990s. It is always difficult to measure the
extent of such influence, but it seems safe to say that if the majority in Theophanous v Herald &
Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104 (‘Theophanous’) had not been weighed down by more
cautious voices, the more moderate resolution for the basis of the freedom agreed upon in
Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520 might not have been
reached.
114 The best example I have found of this is Wald’s assertion that:
The typical tone of a dissent is troubled, outraged, sorrowful, puzzled. It is most apt to turn
away from the technicalities of the majority holding and play to higher levels of aspirations
and values that it sees desecrated by the majority’s insistence on a relentless imposition of
precedent regardless of the consequences. … The strategy of personalization in dissent is to
separate the dissenter from the cold, impersonal, authoritarian judges of the majority, who im-
pliedly do not take the human condition into account when they mercilessly impose ‘the law’.
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D  Concurring Judgments Compared — The Acceptable Face of Disagreement
and Change?
Having considered the various ends which are served by a capacity for judicial
disagreement to manifest itself as a dissenting opinion, it is relevant to consider
the position of concurring judgments and, specifically, the extent to which they
also share these functions. Do concurring judgments achieve much the same
thing but with less threat to stability?
First, we must be aware that the American tendency to lump concurrences and
dissents together under the banner of ‘separate judgments’ reflects the practice
employed by the United States Supreme Court of a majority opinion being
delivered ‘for the Court’ from which the remaining justices may distance
themselves by varying degrees.115 Concurring judgments delivered in the High
Court of Australia are not strictly ‘separate’ from anything. In the absence of an
opinion ‘for the Court’, all those in the majority are in concurrence simply with
each other. Obviously in many cases, one or two judges of the majority may
deliver fuller opinions with which others merely indicate agreement, enabling
identification of the ‘leading’ judgments, but it need not be this way. It has
certainly not been uncommon for all seven members of the Court to deliver their
own individual opinions in full. In such instances it is, to an extent, quite
meaningless to regard concurrences and dissents as being of the same ilk —
judgments which together stand ‘separate’ from a clearly identified and con-
certed majority. Rather the collection of concurrences amounts to a majority and
it is the dissents alone which are on the outer.
Even so, it is clear that the ability (for which the seriatim practice provides) of
each judge to deliver his or her opinion individually serves many of the benefi-
cial functions identified in relation to the delivery of dissents. ‘Writing sepa-
rately’ may mean quite different things in the practice of the High Court and the
United States Supreme Court, and is traditionally much rarer in the latter forum,
but the essentially individualistic nature of the act itself remains.
Justice Bader Ginsburg’s examination of separate judgments remains the most
lucid examination of the similarities underlying concurrences and dissents by
reason of their capacity to promote individual expression.116 For this reason,
concurring judgments fulfil a democratic function in accord with what has been
outlined above. Although concurring opinions express support for the court’s
Patricia Wald, ‘The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings’ (1995) 62
University of Chicago Law Review 1371, 1412–13.
Even allowing for the numerous differences between the United States Supreme Court and the
High Court of Australia, not the least among them being matters of judicial style, it is dangerous
to generalise about the dissents of any court in the manner Wald has adopted here. Although
examples of the type of judgment she describes undoubtedly do exist — Australian classics of
the genre include the opinions of Evatt J in Waverley City Council v Chester (1939) 62 CLR 1
and, more recently, Kirby J in Re Wakim (1999) 198 CLR 511 — it would indeed be surprising if
they were the norm. Wald’s error is that her conception of dissent denies its primarily relational,
rather than substantive, nature.
115 See Bader Ginsburg, above n 58, 134; Flanders, above n 1, 401. Wald’s claim that ‘[m]ost
judges dissent more than concur’ (Wald, above n 114, 1413) reflects how very different the
notion of concurrence is made by the United States Supreme Court’s practice of delivering a
core majority opinion.
116 Bader Ginsburg, above n 58, 136
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resolution of the ultimate issues in a case, they are just as potent as outright
dissent at indicating the deliberations of that body. In so far as the judicial strain
of deliberative democracy is sustained by freedom of expression, it should not be
forgotten that even within a concurrence a level of disagreement may still be
given voice.117
As contributions to a judicial dialogue, concurrences may play a part in pro-
moting more thorough opinion writing in the same way as dissents. On the
whole, however, concurrences are seen as problematic in their contribution to the
clarity of judicial work. Whereas a dissent may be said to provide a useful
contrast to the majority judgments, a majority result which is assembled through
concurrences can be contradictory and confusing. While an ability to agree with
the orders of the court but for reasons distinct from those adopted by others on
the bench is undoubtedly valuable, the suspicion has been voiced that separate
concurring judgments have often been delivered when consensus building would
have been both possible and appropriate.118
A profusion of substantially similar concurring opinions serves less purpose
than a clear statement of dissent and is more harmful to the coherence of the law
that the court lays down. It seems that this is a concern in jurisdictions beyond
our own,119 indicating inadequate conferencing processes adopted by the
117 This is true even if the disagreement extends only to matters of written expression.
118 Coper, Encounters with the Australian Constitution, above n 76, 151; Geoffrey Sawer,
Australian Federalism in the Courts (1967) 50–1. This complaint was raised by the former
Attorney-General at the swearing in of Gleeson CJ: Bernard Lane, ‘Gleeson Calls for Reorder in
the Court’, The Weekend Australian (Sydney), 23–4 May 1998, 4. Perhaps the most impolite
criticism along these lines comes from the Canadian McWhinney who writes:
it may be less a matter of one single opinion versus multiple opinions than of the nature and
content of the opinions when actually written. The five dreary, repetitive, Gothic, opinions
written by the judges of the High Court of Australia in the Bank Nationalisation case [Com-
monwealth v Bank of New South Wales (1948) 76 CLR 1] gain, it is suggested, little by com-
parison with the Privy Council’s single opinion in the same case.
McWhinney, above n 7, 623.
119 In respect of the difficulties caused by concurrence in the Supreme Court of Canada, see Laskin,
above n 53, 1047–8. Almost 50 years later, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé expressed similar concerns
about concurrences but reported that the ‘phenomenon is increasingly rare’: L’Heureux-Dubé,
above n 1, 514. Justice Bader Ginsburg has also stated that in the United States Supreme Court
‘[m]ore unsettling than the high incidence of dissent is the proliferation of separate opinions
with no single opinion commanding a clear majority’: Bader Ginsburg, above n 58, 148.
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court,120 difficult personal relations amongst its members121 and also (ironically)
the impact of improvements in staffing and technology.122
So far as developmental functions are concerned, there is no reason to presume
that obiter dicta expressed in concurring opinions has less potential in this
respect than dissents. Indeed, the converse is true. Beyond their contribution to
the ratio decidendi of the decision, the precedential value of statements found in
the concurring opinions of the majority is likely to be more persuasive than those
contained in dissents.123 The use of opinions expressed in concurring judgments
is undoubtedly the way in which much subtle and incremental change occurs in
the law. We would expect the frequency with which dissent assists the develop-
ment of legal principle to be less — however, the actual extent of change which a
dissent may assist to bring about is likely to be much more pronounced.
Concurrences and dissents share a number of features. They both fulfil demo-
cratic and developmental functions, though admittedly concurrences do so in a
less noticeable manner than dissents. This is not just a result of their status as
representing a fundamental degree of consensus, but must also be attributable to
their implicit place within the practice of delivering opinions in seriatim. Unlike
their position in America, concurring judgments are simply the usual method by
which judges in the English tradition express agreement with each other, despite
occasional instances of welcome unanimity. Unfortunately, this strong sense of
individualism over institutionalism presents problems of clarity which can
obscure the actual decision. It is ironic that, in this sense, the formal expression
of judicial disagreement in a dissent is less harmful to the certainty of the law.
III   ARGUMENTS FOR RESTRAINT — THE HAZARDS OF  DISSENT
The previous part considered three broad functions which an ability to dissent
may be said to serve. While there are unquestionably benefits associated with
120 Laskin, above n 53; Sawer, above n 118, 49–50. There is some degree of overlap between this
topic and assessments of the effectiveness of the leadership qualities of the presiding Chief
Justice: see Sue Davis, ‘The Chief Justice and Judicial Decision-Making: The Institutional Basis
for Leadership on the Supreme Court’ in Cornell Clayton and Howard Gillman (eds), Supreme
Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches (1999) 135, 144–6; O’Brien,
above n 49, 97–9, 109–11.
121 Lloyd, above n 63, 179; Marr, above n 7, 233; Mason, ‘Personal Relations’, above n 67, 532;
Simpson and Simpson, above n 66. To gain a sense as to how problems of collegiality have
affected the United States Supreme Court, see Edward Lazarus, Closed Chambers: The First
Eyewitness Account of the Epic Struggles inside the Supreme Court (1998); Melvin Urofsky,
Division and Discord: The Supreme Court under Stone and Vinson, 1941–1953 (1997); Bob
Woodward and Scott Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court (first published 1979,
1981 ed).
122 Justice Bader Ginsburg cites the ‘multiplication of law clerks’ and ‘more efficient means to
retrieve and process words’ as reducing the need for judges to work as cooperatively with their
colleagues as in the past: above n 58, 148–9. See also O’Brien, above n 49, 103, 110.
123 MacAdam and Pyke say that ‘it is an entirely proper part of the judicial process for authoritative
propositions of law to be extracted out of a combination of majority and minority judgments as
long as such propositions are not in conflict with the majority ratio and/or the result in the case’:
Alastair MacAdam and John Pyke, Judicial Reasoning and the Doctrine of Precedent in Austra-
lia (1998) 210. While it is apparent that this qualification does not restrict the use of dissents, it
does indicate that concurring opinions are probably going to be more helpful — unless, of
course, one is advocating the overruling of the earlier decision.
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dissent, it is far from the case that dissents are routinely well received.124 Aside
from the substance of any particular dissenting opinion, the practice itself can, in
certain circumstances, evoke ambiguous feelings. For while we can identify the
benefits of dissent, these can be difficult to reconcile with law’s preference for
order, clarity and conformity. This part of the article will examine the arguments
for judicial restraint in dissenting.
A  Certainty and Coherence
Although Justice Kirby has described the judiciary as ‘the last empire of gov-
ernmental individualism’,125 there are numerous examples of Australian judges
refraining from an insistence upon their personal views so as to enable the court
to settle a question of importance with sufficient clarity. Perhaps the most
infamous of these are the opinions delivered by Gibbs and Stephen JJ in Queen-
sland v Commonwealth,126 in which their Honours resisted the temptation to
maintain the views they had expressed in an earlier case127 and refused to form a
majority with the persistent Barwick CJ and the newly arrived Aickin J to
invalidate the representation of the territories in the Senate. In following the
majority decision from which they had earlier dissented, Gibbs and Stephens JJ
made it very clear that — although they were still of the view that the majority
approach was incorrect — they saw more value in avoiding an overruling within
such a short space of time that was made possible only through a change in the
composition of the Court.128 Perhaps Stewart J of the United States Supreme
Court best expressed the source of such reluctance when he said:
A basic change in the law upon a ground no firmer than a change in our mem-
bership invites the popular misconception that this institution is little different
from the two political branches of the Government. No misconception could do
more lasting injury to this Court and to the system of law which it is our abid-
ing mission to serve.129
On the high importance of consistency, Gibbs J had this to say:
No Justice is entitled to ignore the decisions and reasoning of his predecessors,
and to arrive at his own judgment as though the pages of the law reports were
124 Michael Coper, ‘The Path of the Law’ (2002) 76 Australian Law Journal 716, 719.
125 Kirby, above n 23, 16.
126 (1977) 139 CLR 585 (‘Second Territory Senators Case’).
127 Western Australia v Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 201 (‘First Territory Senators Case’).
128 Aickin J had been appointed to replace McTiernan J, a member of the majority in the original
case. Coper clearly suggests this as a significant factor in explaining Gibbs and Stephen JJ’s
conduct: Coper, Encounters with the Australian Constitution, above n 76, 153.
129 Mitchell v W T Grant Co, 416 US 600, 636 (1974) (‘Mitchell’). Stewart J’s discomfort at
exploiting a change in the composition of the Court to gain ascendancy for views he had ex-
pressed previously in dissent is well documented by Woodward and Armstrong, most memora-
bly in a scene recounting an exchange between Stewart and White JJ where the latter described
Stewart J’s stance as ‘kind of a chickenshit position’: Woodward and Armstrong, above n 121,
483. For an earlier American statement along the lines of Stewart J’s comments in Mitchell, see
the dissenting judgment of White J in Pollock v Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co, 157 US 429, 651
(1895).
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blank, or as though the authority of a decision did not survive beyond the rising
of the Court.130
For both Justices, the duty to follow the earlier decision was determined by a
number of factors, but avoidance of the confusion and disappointed expectations
of the peoples of the territories caused by a reversal was of great significance.131
In dissent, Barwick CJ and Aickin J made it clear that, to their minds, such a
consideration held little sway against a judge’s individual conviction of being
right.132 Their view was, to paraphrase Kelman, that if dissent is an appeal to the
intelligence of a future day, the dissenter should not falter because that day
arrives sooner than expected.133
The example of the Second Territory Senators Case is interesting because it
displays remarkable self-sacrifice by Gibbs and Stephen JJ. Justice L’Heureux-
Dubé has said that ‘even the most ardent defender of dissenting opinions will be
compelled to admit that in most cases, it is the majority opinion which blazes the
law’s trail.’134 This was decidedly not such a case — far from any compulsion,
the two Justices had in fact a clear ability to claim ascendancy for a previous
dissenting view which they still believed to be correct. That they refrained from
such action illustrates that in some circumstances (or, at least, with some judges)
the value of institutional consistency is far from a hollow ideal but has real
power in curbing instability in the law.
Of course, it is less dramatic when a potential dissenter recants from views
which stand next to no real chance of attracting majority support. Nevertheless,
such occasions are significant evidence as to the importance of coherency in
judicial method. A classic example is provided by the judgment of Dawson J in
Richardson v Forestry Commission,135 in which his Honour repeated his objec-
tions to the expansive interpretation of the external affairs power arrived at by
the majority in Tasmania v Commonwealth.136 Having done so, his Honour
proceeded to explain why he would, despite retaining those views, accept the
authority of the earlier decision from now on:
Precedent must, however, have a part to play, even in the interpretation of a
constitution. Considerations of practicality make it necessary that the law
should, as far as possible, take a consistent course. The constant re-examination
of concluded questions is incompatible with that aim.137
130 Second Territory Senators Case (1977) 139 CLR 585, 599. This sentiment was recently echoed
by Gummow J in SGH Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 210 CLR 51, 75: ‘The
state of the law of the Constitution at any given time is to be perceived by study of both the
constitutional text and of the Commonwealth Law Reports’.
131 Second Territory Senators Case (1977) 139 CLR 585, 600 (Gibbs J), 603–4 (Stephen J).
132 Ibid 594 (Barwick CJ), 630–1 (Aickin J). Indeed, and remarkably, Aickin J ‘formed the view
that this is not a case where it can be said that the previous decision has been “acted upon” …
notwithstanding that elections have been held and persons so elected have sat in each House and
acted as members thereof ’: at 630–1.
133 Maurice Kelman, ‘The Forked Path of Dissent’ [1985] Supreme Court Review 227, 284 fn 222.
134 L’Heureux-Dubé, above n 1, 498.
135 (1988) 164 CLR 261.
136 (1983) 158 CLR 1 (‘Tasmanian Dam Case’).
137 Richardson v Forestry Commission (1988) 164 CLR 261, 322. Dawson J went on to adopt a
similar approach in subsequent cases: Queensland v Commonwealth (1989) 167 CLR 232, 247
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Similar motivations are present in instances where members of the court
explicitly tailor their judgments so as to make a clear majority view possible.
This practice differs from the cases just considered because it involves no
reference to an earlier dissent, but rather prevents a dissenting opinion from
coming into existence. Two recent striking examples of this spring to mind. First,
Deane J’s winding back of the more extreme aspects of his approach to the
consequences of the implied freedom of political speech found in Theophanous
so that he could form a majority on the facts with Mason CJ, Toohey and
Gaudron JJ.138 Similarly, Kirby J, after setting down his ideal approach to
questions of dishonesty in instructing the jury in a trial for conspiracy to defraud,
abandoned it in order that a useful majority be formed in Peters v The Queen.139
The other four judges in that case were evenly divided over the matter. Kirby J
acknowledged that no immediate value would be gained from his deciding the
matter in accordance with his own preferred view — and (presumably) that any
prospective impact was unlikely. Thus, his Honour decided to use his vote
pragmatically and effectively aborted a potential dissent:
As this Court is evenly divided on the applicable legal test, as there is a clear
majority for dismissing the appeal which my opinion cannot affect and as it is
essential that the Court should provide clear instruction to those who have the
responsibility of conducting criminal trials, whilst preferring my own opinions
I withdraw them. For the purposes of procuring a holding on the issues argued
in this appeal, I concur in the opinions expressed by Toohey and Gaudron JJ on
the point of difference between them and McHugh J and Gummow J.140
All the judgments discussed in this section demonstrate an aversion to the
costs incurred by disagreement. The dissenting judge may often be seen as
‘[adding] to the confusion of [the law], for he turns the spot-light away from the
issues in the case and keeps it focused upon himself; he tells the world that the
law is indefinite, except as expounded by him.’141 Clearly, however, complete
personal satisfaction with the result in a case is often sacrificed to the higher
(‘Tropical Rainforests Case’); Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416, 565–72 (‘Indus-
trial Relations Act Case’).
138 (1994) 182 CLR 104, 187–8. Deane J published this as an addendum to his formal judgment,
saying, inter alia (at 188):
majority support for the operation of the implication in a case such as the present exists for,
but is limited to, that attributed to it by Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ. In these circum-
stances, the appropriate course for me to follow is to lend my support for the answers which
their Honours give to the questions reserved by the stated case.
The effect of this compromise upon the precedential value of Theophanous was made clear by
comments of the Court in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520,
554–6 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ).
139 (1997) 192 CLR 493.
140 Ibid 556. There are, of course, other examples of this kind of strategic voting: the comments of
Murphy J in Uebergang v Australian Wheat Board (1980) 145 CLR 266, 309 come to mind:
‘while adhering to my own view of s 92, I would, as an alternative, support that which seems to
be the nearest to mine in order to obtain or increase the vote for that view and to reject a more
extreme alternative.’ Just what influences a judge to such transparency when others must pre-
sumably resolve such choices before writing their judgment and see little point in extrapolating
upon them is difficult to discern.
141 William Hirt, ‘In the Matter of Dissents Inter Judices de Jure’ (1960) 31 Pennsylvania Bar
Association Quarterly 256, 259.
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ideal of legal certainty — as Brandeis J famously declared, ‘[i]t is usually more
important that a rule of law be settled, than that it be settled right’.142 That
statement now invites more rigorous scrutiny given the developments in legal
theory since the early decades of the 20th century. In a legal milieu where it has
long been conjectured that there is no such thing which may simply be identified
as the ‘right’ answer,143 conscious decisions by an individual judge to strengthen
an acceptable and justifiable alternative view so as to achieve institutional
coherence should not be surprising. Some of the examples given above are more
illustrative of this point than others. The judgments of Gibbs and Dawson JJ, on
the one hand, are not so clearly in this vein since they forcefully maintain the
correctness of their own approach, despite supporting the contrary, established
view on precedential grounds. Thus, these opinions perhaps more perfectly
reflect the aphorism of Brandeis J. On the other hand, Deane and Kirby JJ make
it clear that, whilst they have one solution in mind, they are prepared to concede
the merits of another. Interestingly, Stephen J, writing at a time when it was
much rarer to see such express admissions of the indeterminacy of the law
emanating from the Australian bench, seems to adopt a similar approach in the
Second Territory Senators Case.144 In referring to the earlier decision which he is
now following, his Honour says that ‘[t]he case was very much one upon which
different minds might reach different conclusions, no one view being inherently
entitled to any pre-eminence as conforming better than others to principle or to
precedent.’145
However, one must be cautious of taking this analysis too far. From the tenor
of the observations made above, the idea that law is regarded as more indetermi-
nate and that the process of adjudication is more supple than previous genera-
tions admitted would seem to lead naturally to a greater incidence of subsuming
individual opinion to the benefits of institutional consensus. Yet dissent seems
just as prevalent now as in past eras, if not more so. This is undoubtedly due to a
range of diverse factors,146 but it seems reasonable to suggest that one of them is,
in fact, the dismantling of the formalist, declaratory tradition itself. So, whilst the
acknowledgment that a number of alternative solutions are legally and logically
142 Di Santo v Pennsylvania, 273 US 34, 42 (1927). It should, however, be acknowledged that in the
same paragraph Brandeis J went on to suggest that ‘[i]n the search for truth through the slow
process of inclusion and exclusion, involving trial and error, it behooves us to reject, as guides,
the decisions upon such questions which prove to have been mistaken.’
143 See the references to Alder and Pound in above n 12. Even a Dworkinian analysis concedes
some room for disagreement between justices about final answers, though this does not rob them
of being ‘right’ in the sense with which he uses that term: Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire
(1986) 264.
144 (1977) 139 CLR 585.
145 Ibid 603. For an even earlier example, consider the words of Dixon J in A-G (NSW) v Perpetual
Trustee Co Ltd (1952) 85 CLR 237 in refusing to depart from ‘a recent and well considered
decision upon what is evidently a highly disputable question’: at 214 (emphasis added).
146 Almost all of these are touched upon over the course of this article and to catalogue them here
would prove cumbersome. As succinct a list of factors (no fewer than 26) giving rise to dissent
as it is possible to compile is found in Ben Palmer, ‘Present Dissents: Causes of the Justices’
Disagreements’ (1949) 35 American Bar Association Journal 189. The most original and com-
prehensive attempt to explain the sociological factors stimulating the growth of dissenting opin-
ions in American courts from the 1930s is the study of Kadzielski and Kunda, above n 70. I am
unaware of an equivalent Australian study.
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possible may be seen, at least in some cases, to provide a sound justification for
judges to abandon their own view in order to support that which is advocated by
their colleagues, it appears that admitting the scope of choice has only made
consensus less likely overall.147
Coherence definitely exercises a strong pull upon judicial officers and this idea
will be further examined below in the specific context of the rules of precedent.
The benefits of consistency and certainty in the law are so obvious as not to
require lengthy discussion. Yet the fact that greater recognition of the malleable
state of the law has not resulted in higher rates of agreement, but rather the
converse, must say something about the process or, more likely, its participants.
B  Individualism and the Authority of the Court
It is appropriate at this juncture to consider some of the more severe criticism
reserved for dissenters. While the last section was concerned with the destabi-
lising effect which dissent may have upon the state of the law, an additional
dimension is the damage which a lack of consensus may inflict upon the court
itself. To quote the words of Judge Learned Hand, dissent ‘cancels the impact of
monolithic solidarity on which the authority of a bench of judges so largely
depends.’148
This remains an elusive concept to observe in practice despite its natural
extension from the desire to maintain coherence and consistency in the law and
despite the degree to which it has been discussed by commentators in the past.
This is because it is not actually dissent per se which is frowned upon, but rather
the broader malady of individualism of which it is perhaps the most obvious
symptom. It seems a strangely neutral objection in that the relative merits of the
majority and minority views do not seem to matter. The very existence of the
dissent is resented as an irritation and as a challenge to the security of the
majority. Any orthodoxy of method, let alone developmental potential, which the
dissent may possess is dismissed. This is compounded by the simple truth that
the days of judicial unanimity are long gone, if they were not gone already when
Judge Learned Hand wrote in 1958.149
147 O’Brien, writing of the United States Supreme Court, puts it thus:
In sum, agreement on an institutional opinion for the Court’s decisions was once deemed cen-
tral to the Court’s prestige and legitimacy, and to preserving the myth that law is not merely a
reflection of politics. The forces of American Legal Realism and liberal legalism brought to
the Court by the New Deal justices transformed that norm into one of individual expression.
O’Brien, above n 49, 111. He ascribes the maintenance of individual expression over subsequent
decades to judicial socialisation: at 104–5. Palmer, above n 146, pithily echoes this with his 20th
reason for dissent (at 190): ‘Relativism, skepticism, cynicism, distrust of reason and of logic,
despair of attempts to arrive at objective standards of value, denial of absolute truths’.
148 Judge Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights: The Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures, 1958 (1958) 72.
See also Schermers, above n 52, 1: ‘A divided oracle could not have the authority that is crucial
to indisputable interpretation.’
149 Just one year after Judge Learned Hand’s speech, ZoBell considered that ‘[e]ven if a jural
reincarnation of the Great Chief Justice [Marshall] were to preside, the idea of imposing judicial
silence upon his Associates by external means — whether by positive law or by the fiat of the
Chief Justice — would be intolerable to today’s lawyers and judges’: Karl ZoBell, ‘Division of
Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial Disintegration’ (1959) 44 Cornell Law
Quarterly 186, 209–10 (citations omitted).
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Nevertheless, the perceived connection between dissenting opinions and
harmful individualism remains strong. In his evaluation of the High Court under
Chief Justices Mason and Brennan, Patapan warns of the danger of law students
being seduced by the easy appeal of a judicial method which is prepared to
displace law in order to achieve what is perceived as just.150 The source of this
activist influence is identified (somewhat surprisingly) as the ‘example and
ambitions of the “Great Dissenter” on the Bench’.151 This comment reflects
Judge Learned Hand’s automatic disdain for dissent, rather than a more princi-
pled denunciation of an unacceptable methodology leading to poor judging per
se — something which, by way of contrast, Gava attacks without discrimination
as to whether the opinion is dissenting or not.152 It is clear, then, that Gava’s
‘hero-judges’ need not be dissenters — as clear as Chief Justice Gleeson’s
converse insistence that dissenters are not heroes.153
Of course, there are a few cases where a split in a court clearly did not reflect
well on the authority of either the decision reached or the institution itself. The
most dramatic example which comes to mind is the United States Supreme
Court’s 5:4 split in Bush v Gore.154 That the case had such momentous conse-
quences and involved the Court in what might be seen as an abject failure of the
democratic process, presents it as one where an aura of ‘monolithic solidarity’
would have been more desirable than not.155 An Australian example on a par
with that case is hard to produce, though arguably the controversy that resulted
from Wik Peoples v Queensland 156 was aggravated in no small way by the fact
that it was a knife-edge decision.
However, satisfying as unanimity might be, there is no denying that it remains
a false comfort. Judge Learned Hand’s desire is fundamentally unattainble. As
Sir Anthony Mason has said:
The High Court is not a monolithic institution. It is at any time a group of seven
justices who are obliged to hear and determine, according to their individual
judgment, particular cases. The justices may have conflicting views on the role
of the Court as well as on the principles of law which should govern the case in
hand. It would therefore be a serious mistake to assume that, in deciding a case,
the Court as an institution embarks upon any general policy with a view to
150 Haig Patapan, Judging Democracy: The New Politics of the High Court of Australia (2000) 192.
151 Ibid. I have identified elsewhere the incongruity of this assertion from Patapan given his
criticism of some of the majority judgments from the High Court across this period: see Andrew
Lynch, ‘The High Court — Legitimacy and Change: Haig Patapan, Judging Democracy — The
New Politics of the High Court of Australia’ (2001) 29 Federal Law Review 295, 313.
152 Gava, above n 12, 747.
153 ‘Only someone given to mock heroics, or lacking a sense of the ridiculous, could characterise
differences of judicial opinion in terms of bravery’: Chief Justice Murray Gleeson, ‘Judicial
Legitimacy’ (Speech delivered at the Australian Bar Association Conference, New York, 2 July
2000).
154 531 US 98 (2000). In that case, Stevens J stated that ‘[o]ne thing … is certain. Although we may
never know with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this year’s Presidential elec-
tion, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation’s confidence in the judge as an
impartial guardian of the rule of law. I respectfully dissent’: at 128–9.
155 Certainly, this conclusion is affirmed when one considers the strength unanimity lent decisions
such as Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, 347 US 483 (1954); Cooper v Aaron, 358 US 1
(1958); United States v Nixon, 418 US 683 (1974).
156 (1996) 187 CLR 1.
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achieving a particular goal, political or otherwise, external to the disposition of
that case.157
From this statement, it seems that any solidarity which may be achieved is
purely an accidental convergence of views. Indeed, we might well be suspicious
of unanimity — especially in high-profile controversial cases. As Judge Evans
argued, dissents ‘must be, to the thoughtful reader, as well as to the litigants,
proof conclusive that the questions presented were thoroughly and seriously
considered and this conviction should go far to develop respect.’158 If unanimity
is to be seen as largely serendipitous, then dissent, while it may often be regret-
ted, would seem impervious to admonishments of the sort extended by Judge
Learned Hand and others in the same vein.
A final word needs to be added, however, in respect of the phenomenon of
persistent dissent. This will be more fully considered in Part IV of this article,
but the particularly strategic characteristic of this practice means that it can be
seen as amounting to a deliberate challenge to the authority of the court and as
thus warranting the severest reproach. Chief Justice Taft of the United States
Supreme Court took the view that judges who refused to conform were ‘consti-
tutional lawbreakers’.159 Judge Evans took the view that dissenters actually
encouraged lawlessness among the populace.160 Writing on Deane and Gaudron
JJ’s repeated dissents in some High Court cases in the early 1990s, Justice Keith
Mason similarly reflected:
No one expects a judge to give assent to that which he or she believes to be
wrong. But is there not a duty on an individual judge to follow ‘the law’ as de-
clared by the court? Surely it is not overstating it to say, with Thurgood Mar-
shall J that ‘obviously, respect for the rule of law must start with those who are
responsible for pronouncing the law’? Why is a dissenting judge who declines
to follow the majority view declared in an earlier case any different to the jour-
nalist who out of conscience defies the law in refusing to reveal a source?161
The maintenance of a view in repeated defiance of the Court’s earlier holdings
clearly overlays the general issue of dissent with a sharper degree of complexity.
The hostile interaction between the delivery of such opinions and the pervasive
influence of precedent may be seen, in those circumstances, to invest calls for
restraint and solidarity with a greater claim for judicial obedience. However, as
shall be seen, the problem of persistent dissent raises the spectre of other duties
beside mere fealty to the status quo. It is at this juncture that dissent presents
157 Sir Anthony Mason, ‘Foreword’ in Haig Patapan, Judging Democracy: The New Politics of the
High Court of Australia (2000) viii, viii–ix.
158 Judge Evan Evans, ‘The Dissenting Opinion — Its Use and Abuse’ (1938) 3 Missouri Law
Review 120, 129. See also Scalia, above n 68, 35.
159 See Voss, above n 68, 650 (citations omitted). Cf Kelman, above n 133, 255 (citations omitted):
‘A dissenting justice who exercises that prerogative can be accused of stubbornness, lack of
collegiality, or undue pride of opinion, but none of that makes him a “constitutional law-
breaker”’.
160 Evans, above n 158, 125. See also Learned Hand, above n 148, 72.
161 Justice Keith Mason, ‘The Rule of Law’ in P D Finn (ed), Essays on Law and Government —
Volume 1: Principles and Values (1995) 114, 138 (citations omitted). I am grateful to his Honour
for bringing this material to my attention.
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itself at its most challenging for judicial method and the values inherent in the
law.
IV  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISSENT AND PRECEDENT
In the main, dissenting judgments are not diametrically opposed to the concept
of stare decisis, as observers may be tempted to assume.162 This is due to the
largely neutral nature of what is classed as a minority opinion. The point has
been made earlier that dissent is a relational concept rather than one of substance
or form.163 As such, it is entirely possible for a dissenting view to be in staunch
defence of the authority of past precedents and the principle at large.164 Such
incidents lend support to the assessment that precedent is itself, ironically, one of
the more profound sources of disagreement amongst judges.165
Nevertheless, it is important to discuss the doctrine of precedent in any exami-
nation of dissent for two reasons in particular. First, the presence of dissent in a
decision may constitute a handicap to its authoritative value and render it
vulnerable to subsequent overruling. Second — and to return to the problem
identified at the close of the preceding section — the practice of persistently
rejecting the view of a majority of a court does actually imbue the ability to
dissent with a character which renders it hostile to the values of stare decisis.
Before considering these intersections between dissent and precedent, a word is
needed on the applicability of the latter concept generally in courts of last resort.
A  Precedent as a Means of Resolving Disagreement in Law versus Judicial
Choice in Courts of Last Resort
While the constraining influence of precedent is central to its origins and
purpose, the development of the modern doctrine depended very much on its use
within a clearly structured hierarchy of courts.166 Consequently, the rigidity
normally associated with the ‘rules’ of precedent did not actually take hold until
towards the end of the 19th century. It was at this time, with a distinctly tiered
court system, and in the context of other changes to the profession,167 the House
162 For instance, in the first of his controversial series of articles on the United States Supreme
Court of the day, Palmer opened with an overt link between the two, saying: ‘The prestige of the
Court is threatened, if it has not already been seriously impaired, by recent divisions of opinion
within the Court and its reversal of precedents that had come to be regarded as enduring land-
marks of the law’: Ben Palmer, ‘Dissents and Overrulings: A Study of Developments in the
Supreme Court’ (1948) 34 American Bar Association Journal 554, 554.
163 See above nn 77 and 114 and accompanying text.
164 For two examples, see the judgments of the minorities in Trident General Insurance Co
Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 107, 129–31 (Brennan J) and Re Pacific Coal Pty
Ltd; Ex parte Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2000) 203 CLR 346, 448
(Kirby J).
165 See Mason, ‘Personal Relations’, above n 67, 532. See also Ben Palmer, ‘Dissension in the
Court: Stare Decisis or “Flexible Logic”?’ (1948) 34 American Bar Association Journal 887.
166 Sir William Holdsworth, A History of English Law (1938) vol 12, 146; Theodore Plucknett, A
Concise History of the Common Law (5th ed, 1956) 350.
167 Chief amongst these were an improvement in the reliability of court reporting and also the
enhanced respectability of the House of Lords as a judicial body after the exclusion of its lay
members from participating in legal decisions: see Plucknett, above n 166; Holdsworth,
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of Lords laid down restrictions upon its ability to depart from even its own
decisions.168 Though this practice was abandoned by the mid-20th century, it
demonstrates the earnestness with which precedent was treated by those courts
most influential upon the Australian legal system at the time of Federation.
While, as a consequence, the High Court of Australia developed a corre-
sponding deference to the decisions of English courts in respect of the common
law, it never followed the practice of considering itself bound by its own
decisions.169 The well-known statement of Isaacs J in Australian Agricultural
Co v Federated Engine-Drivers and Firemen’s Association of Australasia made
this very clear early on:
The oath of a Justice of this Court is ‘to do right to all manner of people ac-
cording to law.’ Our sworn loyalty is to the law itself, and to the organic law of
the Constitution first of all. If, then, we find the law to be plainly in conflict
with what we or any of our predecessors erroneously thought it to be, we have,
as I conceive, no right to choose between giving effect to the law, and main-
taining an incorrect interpretation. It is not, in my opinion, better that the Court
should be persistently wrong than that it should be ultimately right.
Whatever else may be said with respect to the reconsideration of former deci-
sions — and it is unnecessary here to consider the principles upon which the
Court should act in particular cases — so much at least emerges as is undoubt-
edly beyond challenge, that where a former decision is clearly wrong, and there
are no circumstances countervailing the primary duty of giving effect to the law
as the Court finds it, the real opinion of the Court should be expressed.
In my opinion, where the prior decision is manifestly wrong, then, irrespective
of consequences, it is the paramount and sworn duty of this Court to declare the
law truly.170
This should not be taken to mean that the High Court has played fast and loose
with its past decisions. On the contrary, the connection between the institution
and the English legal system was sufficiently tangible for much of the 20th
century as to result in a sharing by the former of the latter’s core values, even if
it chose not to take the ultimate step of enshrining them in a formal rule. Thus,
the High Court operated in a milieu where precedent was accorded great respect
— not least because in many matters it regarded itself bound by the decisions of
other courts — yet simultaneously it had uninhibited freedom to control the
development of its own jurisprudence, particularly with respect to constitutional
matters. Of course, now that the High Court is the apex of our legal system, it
does not defer to the decisions of any other court and is left entirely to its own
devices in weighing competing authorities.
above n 166, 146–58; Patrick Parkinson, Tradition and Change in Australian Law (2nd ed, 2001)
70–1.
168 London Street Tramways Co, Ltd v London City Council [1898] AC 375. The Court of Appeal
took this step in respect of its own decisions much later in Young v Bristol Aeroplane Company
Ltd [1944] KB 718. This decision still determines practice in that Court: Davis v Johnson [1979]
AC 264.
169 Geelong Harbour Trust Commissioners v Gibbs Bright & Co (1974) 129 CLR 576, 582 (Lord
Diplock) (Privy Council); Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520,
554.
170 (1913) 17 CLR 261, 278–9 (emphasis in original).
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Additionally, the nature of the cases which make their way to final courts
present their own problems for the adherents of a strict application of the
doctrine of precedent. They tend to be ‘hard cases’ to which no pre-existing
authority is readily applicable. In such instances, the scope of judicial choice is
substantially increased in the process of trying to reason a solution by means of
analogy.171 That these choices are far from simple, hinging as they often do upon
extrinsic values, only further explains why the justices are likely to divide over
the best approach.172 Even when a relevant precedent does exist, these factors
may lend truth to the aphorism that ‘hard cases make bad law’ and the judges
deciding at present may find irreconcilable the values which are evident in the
court’s previous work.
The point is that the doctrine of precedent has been accorded a chequered
application in the High Court and is weakened in the context of final courts
generally. The perceived result may be that the doctrine only exists as a con-
straint to be ignored or observed at the discretion of the individual judge: in
short, as no constraint at all. But while this has been a significant criticism
levelled by the realists and critical legal studies movements, the fact remains that
some cases, decried as unpalatable or even wrong, are nevertheless followed.173
This is the surest indicator that precedent does matter.174 While it is perhaps
tempting to swallow a chaos theory of legal method, Bennett’s reasons for
insisting upon the importance of precedent seem to have direct relevance for the
High Court:
There is evidence that precedent does matter a great deal, even in the United
States Supreme Court. First, a number of the justices say it does. Second, any-
one who has ever argued before the Supreme Court knows that an enormous
171 McHugh, above n 23, 44–8; Julius Stone, Precedent and Law: Dynamics of Common Law
Growth (1985) ch 5.
172 Alder, above n 1, 226; Ben Palmer, ‘Background for Dissensions: Pragmatism and Its Effects on
the Law’ (1948) 34 American Bar Association Journal 1092; Roscoe Pound, ‘The Theory of
Judicial Decision’ (1923) 36 Harvard Law Review 641, 654; Pound, ‘Cacoethes Dissentiendi’,
above n 12, 795. With the arrival of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) c 42, the role of values
has been decisively accommodated into the mainstream of the English legal tradition with Lord
Browne-Wilkinson saying:
The features of current judicial reasoning are therefore as follows. First, the actual decision is
primarily based on moral, not legal, factors. Second, those moral reasons are not normally ar-
ticulated in the judgment. Third, the morality applied in any given case is the morality of the
individual judge …
Lord Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson, ‘The Impact on Judicial Reasoning’ in Basil Markesinis (ed),
The Impact of the Human Rights Bill on English Law (1998) 21, 22. It is precisely statements of
this sort which fuel opponents of enhanced judicial review under a Bill of Rights: see Waldron,
above n 29, 180–7.
173 The examples considered in above Part III are strong illustrations of the pull which precedent
will exert upon even the most reluctant of justices.
174 As Bennett has said, ‘if stare decisis means anything interesting at all, it must mean that a
precedent has a claim on our obedience even though we disagree with its substance’: Robert
Bennett, ‘A Dissent on Dissent’ (1991) 74 Judicature 255, 256. See also Harold Spaeth and
Jeffrey Segal, Majority Rule or Minority Will: Adherence to Precedent on the US Supreme Court
(1999) 3. So far as evaluating judicial performance through precedent, Goldsworthy asserts: ‘It
is what judges do in [a] minority of cases, when the law dictates a result which they believe is
unjust or contrary to the public interest, which most clearly indicates whether or not they are
extreme legal realists’: Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Commentary’ in Michael Coper and George Wil-
liams (eds), Justice Lionel Murphy: Influential or Merely Prescient? (1997) 259, 260.
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amount of time and energy is devoted to dealing with precedent, to relying on
it, distinguishing it, urging its overruling. That behaviour is quite irrational if in
fact precedent does not matter at all. … From the earliest days of legal educa-
tion, precedent becomes something like a vocabulary of the law, providing a
framework in which discourse is made possible. That vocabulary does not an-
swer the question posed, but it is both a tool for doing so and a decided influ-
ence on the shape of the answers given.175
So, we are left with courts of last resort that have scope for choice in adjudica-
tion but yet deal routinely in the ‘vocabulary’ of previous authority. The safest
ground does indeed seem to be that, rather than being hidebound by precedent or
rampantly creative, these courts tread a middle road. The advantage of an
extreme position, however, is that it enables definition. In discarding its absolut-
ist stance towards precedent in 1966, the House of Lords proclaimed its intention
to ‘depart from a previous decision when it appears right to do so.’176 As
subsequent experience was to show, the simplicity of that language is only
matched by the supreme confidence that it might actually mean something in
substance.177 The House of Lords should have known from an examination of
other final courts, such as those of Australia and the United States, that to declare
a flexible approach to precedent is one thing, but that effectively striking the
balance is quite another.
B  Factors in Favour of Overruling and the Likelihood of Dissent
Those scrutinising the decisions of courts of last resort would be hard pressed
to discern any clearly consistent approach to departing from past authority.178
This is despite the efforts of members of such courts to articulate guidelines
governing the overruling of past decisions. The High Court of Australia has
indicated a general willingness to consider such a course in the following
context:
the Court will re-examine a decision if it involves a question of ‘vital constitu-
tional importance’ and is ‘manifestly wrong’. Errors in constitutional interpre-
tation are not remediable by the legislature, and the Court’s approach to con-
stitutional matters is not necessarily the same as in matters concerning the
common law or statutes.179
175 Bennett, above n 174, 257 (citations omitted). Stone would agree with Bennett on the use of
precedent — while certainly not determinative of anything, it provides the ‘vocabulary’ through
which judicial choice is made: see Stone, Precedent and Law, above n 171, 83.
176 ‘Note’ in [1966] 3 All ER 77, 77 (Lord Gardiner LC).
177 Julius Stone, ‘The Lords at the Crossroads — When to “Depart” and How!’ (1972) 46
Australian Law Journal 483, 484. See also Julius Stone, ‘1966 and All That! Loosing the Chains
of Precedent’ (1969) 69 Columbia Law Review 1162, 1201–2.
178 Henry Monaghan, ‘Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication’ (1988) 88 Columbia Law
Review 723, 753.
179 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 554. This is not to suggest
that the Court excludes the possibility of departing from precedent in non-constitutional matters
(see John v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth (1989) 166 CLR 417, 438–40
(Mason CJ, Wilson, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ)), but rather that the possibility of legisla-
tive intervention makes it less inclined to do so.
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However, as Sir Anthony Mason wrote: ‘The perennial problem is, of course,
to arrive at the conviction that the old decision is wrong. Many legal questions
are so finely balanced that the balance in favour of one answer rather than
another is marginal.’180
Given this difficulty, judges have tended to require the consideration of factors
additional to a belief that the previous decision is incorrect. This is evident even
in Isaacs J’s insistence that the decision be ‘manifestly’ wrong,181 although this
qualification adds very little.182 Thus Horrigan has identified a two-stage process
where substantive wrongness is simply a precondition for overruling, which is in
turn determined by a number of factors or tests which illuminate the precedential
‘propriety of maintaining a prior decision’.183 These precedential criteria include,
but are by no means limited to, the age of the decision, its place within a line of
authority, differences of opinion within its majority and the degree to which the
decision has been relied upon by the community.184
Dissent is relevant to this issue in two distinct and rather contradictory ways.
First, given the range of factors which may determine the weight to be accorded
to stare decisis, the fact that an earlier decision was reached over protestations
from a minority of the court might assist to weaken it as an authority.185 Admit-
tedly, however, judicial pronouncements have tended to focus upon a lack of
common reasons within the majority186 or a split amongst a bench not fully
180 Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The Use and Abuse of Precedent’ (1988) 4 Australian Bar Review 93, 111.
181 On this point, Harris has effectively called Isaacs J’s bluff by asking: ‘Why should not “mere”
wrongness be enough to warrant departing from an earlier decision? … If there is such a know-
able entity as the organic law of the constitution, should not loyalty to it be overriding every
time? If there is no such entity, is “loyalty” talk plain moonshine?’: J W Harris, ‘Overruling
Constitutional Interpretations’ in Charles Sampford and Kim Preston (eds), Interpreting Consti-
tutions: Theories, Principles and Institutions (1996) 231, 232.
182 Second Territory Senators Case (1977) 139 CLR 585, 621 (Aickin J). See also Monaghan, above
n 178, 762 (emphasis in original): ‘Whether a precedent is seen as clearly wrong is often a
function of the judge’s self-confidence more than of any objective fact.’ Note, however, Nel-
son’s reinvigoration of this debate by arguing that a precedent should be overruled when it can
be shown to be ‘demonstrably erroneous’, by which he means not just that today’s court would
have reached a different result, ‘but also that the prior court went beyond the range of indetermi-
nacy created by the relevant source of law’: Caleb Nelson, ‘Stare Decisis and Demonstrably
Erroneous Precedents’ (2001) 87 Virginia Law Review 1, 8.
183 Bryan Horrigan, ‘Towards a Jurisprudence of High Court Overruling’ (1992) 66 Australian Law
Journal 199, 209. See also Larry Alexander, ‘Constrained by Precedent’ (1989) 63 Southern
California Law Review 1, 59; Gian Boeddu and Richard Haigh, ‘Terms of Convenience: Exam-
ining Constitutional Overrulings by the High Court’ (2003) 31 Federal Law Review 167, 187,
192.
184 Horrigan identifies 10 broad categories of precedential criteria which he groups under three
general headings: (i) the nature of the decision in question; (ii) the nature of the subject matter;
and (iii) the consequences of overruling: Horrigan, above n 183, 210–11. Boeddu and Haigh
have recently considered the effects of individual rights, governmental reliance and public in-
convenience and perception in the overruling of constitutional cases: Boeddu and Haigh, above
n 183, 171–86. See generally R C Springall, ‘Stare Decisis as Applied by the High Court to Its
Previous Decisions’ (1978) 9 Federal Law Review 483; Leslie Zines, The High Court and the
Constitution (4th ed, 1997) 433–44. For a list of factors derived from consideration of English, as
well as Australian, cases, see Lyndel Prott, ‘When Will a Superior Court Overrule Its Own
Decision?’ (1978) 52 Australian Law Journal 304, 314–15.
185 See Cain v Malone (1942) 66 CLR 10, 15 (Latham CJ); Cullen v Trappell (1980) 146 CLR 1,
10–11 (Gibbs J); Mason, ‘The Use and Abuse of Precedent’, above n 180, 101.
186 See Re Tyler; Ex parte Foley (1994) 181 CLR 18, 35 (Gaudron J). Cf McHugh J at 37–8.
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constituted187 rather than the presence of dissent per se. The reason for this
would be the danger of simple disagreement and subsequent overruling due only
to a change in the composition of the bench — something which judges are
usually adamant should not be a factor inducing change in the law.188 The United
States Supreme Court has not been quite so careful in resisting the temptation to
use the presence of dissent as an Achilles heel, leading Voss to conclude of that
body that ‘dissents are not only a blaring difference of opinion by a justice, but
are now a speeding vehicle for reconsideration of precedent.’189 From the
foregoing Australian authorities, such an assessment is not readily applicable to
the dissenting opinions of the High Court. Indeed, dissents may be of as little
importance in undermining a precedent as unanimity is in protecting one.190
This ambiguity about the relevance of dissent as a factor in overruling reflects
the frustrating fluidity of all the precedential considerations generally.191
Dixon J’s statement that the ‘Court has adopted no very definite rule as to the
circumstances in which it will reconsider an earlier decision’192 is as true today
as it was over 50 years ago. It is in this regard that we come to the second
important way in which this topic relates to dissent. The inherently unstable
application of stare decisis in a final court manifests the differing emphases
which judges ascribe to the incommensurable values of consistency, certainty,
flexibility and change.193 Thus, questions of precedent go straight to the heart of
judicial choice, while sharp divisions among the judges, who necessarily pursue
individualistic balancing of those values, must be expected.194
187 Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 103 (Brennan J). Though not even this was enough in
Perpetual Executors and Trustees Association of Australia Ltd v Federal Commissioner of
Taxation (1949) 77 CLR 493, 496 (Latham CJ, Rich, Dixon, McTiernan and Webb JJ). The even
split in the six member bench presiding in Gould v Brown (1998) 193 CLR 346 caused debate
over its precedential value very shortly thereafter in Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198
CLR 511, with that divide being best observed by comparing the comments of Gummow and
Hayne JJ (at 570–2) with those of Kirby J in lone dissent (at 598).
188 R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Brisbane Tramways Co Ltd
[No 1] (1914) 18 CLR 54, 69 (Barton J) (‘Tramways Case’); Second Territory Senators Case
(1977) 139 CLR 585, 600 (Gibbs J). See also Lord Wilberforce’s clarification of the Practice
Statement of 1966 (‘Note’ in [1966] 3 All ER 77) in this respect in Fitzleet Estates Ltd v Cherry
(Inspector of Taxes) [1977] 3 All ER 996, 999. Cf Second Territory Senators Case (1977) 139
CLR 585, 594 (Barwick CJ); Transcript of Proceedings, Levy v Victoria (High Court of Austra-
lia, Dawson J, 6 August 1996). The tension between this ideal and the reality that new members
of a court will legitimately bring a new perspective to bear on the law is perhaps best captured in
a succinct paragraph of Kirby J’s opinion in Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511,
597–8.
189 Voss, above n 68, 660. The example cited by Voss is the comments of Rehnquist CJ in
Payne v Tennessee, 501 US 808, 829 (1991).
190 Note, by way of example, the willingness of three members of the majority (Gaudron, Gummow
and Kirby JJ) in Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 513 to dispatch
Teori Tau v Commonwealth (1969) 119 CLR 564 to the annals of legal history.
191 Indeed, in light of this, Keyzer postulates that ‘[c]hanges in the composition of the bench may
well be the most reliable indicator that constitutional change is likely’: Patrick Keyzer, ‘When Is
an Issue of “Vital Constitutional Importance”? Principles Which Guide the Reconsideration of
Constitutional Decisions in the High Court of Australia’ (1999) 2 Constitutional Law and Policy
Review 13, 18.
192 A-G (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co (Ltd) (1952) 85 CLR 237, 243–4.
193 Mason, ‘The Use and Abuse of Precedent’, above n 180, 111; Zines, above n 184, 443–4.
194 Alder’s analysis of the causes of dissent lying in the clash of incommensurable values is directly
relevant to this point: Alder, above n 1, 227–33. Cf Horrigan, above n 183: Horrigan’s stance
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C  Sustained Defiance of Precedent — The Practice of Persistent Dissent
Nowhere is the discord over values so blatant as in the refusal by a minority of
judges to adhere to a precedent arrived at or maintained by their colleagues. The
practice of persistent dissent evinces a clear favouring of the values of change
and reform over those of predictability and stability, as well as a stubborn belief
that the dissenter’s view is correct. Isaacs J’s declaration that ‘sworn loyalty’ to
the law demands that it be given effect despite ‘conflict with what we or any of
our predecessors erroneously thought it to be’ makes plain the way in which he
ranks the values under discussion.195 His continued dissent over the legitimacy
of the implied reserved state powers and intergovernmental immunities doctrines
demonstrated the consequences of this conviction — a court repeatedly fractured
over the same issue and, arguably, a weakened strain of authority vulnerable to
overthrow under changed conditions.196
Despite the earlier comments about the scope for judicial choice, it appears
that there are some issues where judges are convinced that ‘the question on
analysis is capable of but one answer.’197 In addition to the example of Isaacs
and Higgins JJ in the cases leading to Amalgamated Society of Engineers v
Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd,198 consider again the judgments of Barwick CJ and
Aickin J in the Second Territory Senators Case.199 Another prominent pattern of
persistent dissent was set by Deane and Gaudron JJ in the early 1990s.200
Focusing upon the legal values of the individual judges themselves would seem
to be just as important as identifying the substantive issues which may give rise
to a refusal to follow past authority. A belief that the present law is not as it
ought to be is one thing and a view commonly encountered — but what drives
the persistent dissenters, and differentiates them from their colleagues, is the
refusal to be swayed by any of the precedential criteria as a basis for upholding
that law.201 Between the ‘organic law’ and the precedents there can be no
contest: the individual’s sense of duty as a judge outstrips any gains from
seems to reject this as insufficient and to demand that there be devised a ‘measure commensu-
rating these competing demands of flexibility and certainty’ (at 214) in order to establish ‘de-
terminate guidelines for High Court overruling and other precedential issues’ (at 216). Boeddu
and Haigh suggest that ‘while no exact guidelines can be formulated, it behoves the Court to be
direct and avoid reasoning by the use of easy, but unhelpful, terminology’: Boeddu and Haigh,
above n 183, 194.
195 Australian Agricultural Co v Federated Engine-Drivers and Firemen’s Association of
Australasia (1913) 17 CLR 261, 278.
196 See generally John Goldring, ‘The Path to Engineers’ in Michael Coper and George Williams
(eds), How Many Cheers for Engineers? (1997) 1; Zelman Cowen, Isaac Isaacs (1993) 153–62.
197 Babaniaris v Lutony Fashions Pty Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 1, 14 (Mason J).
198 (1920) 28 CLR 129 (‘Engineers Case’).
199 (1977) 139 CLR 585.
200 These justices advanced a view of s 118 of the Constitution in Breavington v Godleman (1988)
169 CLR 41 which they maintained in the face of contrary majority opinion in McKain v R W
Miller & Co (South Australia) Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 1; Stevens v Head (1993) 176 CLR 433;
Goryl v Greyhound Australia Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 463. Deane and Gaudron JJ showed
similar persistence in another line of cases concerned with the jurisdiction of military tribunals:
Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518; Re Nolan; Ex parte Young (1991) 172 CLR 460;
Re Tyler; Ex parte Foley (1994) 181 CLR 18 (in the latter case, cf McHugh J).
201 See Zines, above n 184, 444.
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institutional consistency. This disparity in judicial outlook is understandably a
source of frustration to those following the Court’s work:
What makes it difficult, and very unsatisfactory, is that not all of our appellate
judges play by the same rules. With the current High Court, it is often impossi-
ble to predict whether individual justices will accept the ruling of the majority
in an earlier case as representing the law unless and until it is reconsidered by
the High Court itself.202
Persistent dissenters are motivated by two concerns. First, they are unable to
sign off on a view they find unacceptable. Examples abound of course, but the
most striking demonstration of absolute rejection (and indeed repulsion) of a
majority view are the repeated dissents of Brennan and Marshall JJ of the United
States Supreme Court against the constitutionality of the death penalty.203 The
second reason is more purposive: ‘By acting on the basis of his own counter-
doctrine, the dissident may imagine that he is preventing the official position
from settling into a marmoreal hardness that will defy future displacement.’204
Through repeated assertion of his or her views, the dissenting judge indicates
more than a hopefulness that their position will ‘appeal … to the intelligence of a
future day’.205 This is a deliberate strategy to ensure that the majority view is not
further entrenched by unanimity and that the door remains open for an about-
face in the law at some later juncture. In this way, persistent dissent would seem
particularly driven by the considerations of development in the law which were
canvassed in Part II.
Bennett, however, argues that the initial filing of a dissent capitalises upon
those advantages and that, in most cases, subsequent protestations add very little.
At the same time, he argues that they inflict damage upon the courts and the law
itself through the consequent instability and unpredictability.206 Kelman re-
sponds:
The idea of keeping the issue alive is perfectly legitimate. Whatever its actual
effectiveness, it is not an act of institutional treachery on the part of the dis-
senter. There is no ethical imperative that confines a dissenter to a single, not-
to-be-repeated statement of disagreement.207
What is striking in both these conflicting assessments is that neither Bennett
nor Kelman can actually state as a matter of fact what the impact of persistent
dissent has been upon the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court. In
fact, both commentators seem to think the impression left by repetition is
minimal.208 Bennett’s position is therefore easier to appreciate than Kelman’s,
202 Mason, above n 161, 137 (citations omitted).
203 Michael Mello, ‘Adhering to Our Views: Justices Brennan and Marshall and the Relentless
Dissent to Death as a Punishment’ (1995) 22 Florida State University Law Review 591; Michael
Mello, Against the Death Penalty — The Relentless Dissents of Justices Brennan and Marshall
(1996).
204 Kelman, above n 133, 254.
205 Hughes, above n 59, 68.
206 Bennett, above n 174, 260.
207 Kelman, above n 133, 254.
208 Ibid 255.
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the latter waiving the institutional costs, while simultaneously admitting that the
profits of the practice may be slim. But the fact that a minority of the United
States Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the ‘need for continued dissent’
from majority rulings on issues of state immunity from federal law209 indicates
that, at least from a judicial perspective, there is real value to be gained from
taking such a course. This would seem to warrant a proper assessment of the
consequences of persistent dissent in order to conduct a well-rounded debate on
these issues.
The experience of the High Court of Australia also invites greater scrutiny of
this phenomenon. To return to an example given above, it is interesting to
speculate whether the Court in the Engineers Case would have rejected the
implied federal doctrines had there not been a string of dissents from Isaacs and
Higgins JJ drawing attention to their inadequacies. Even accepting the influence
of other factors,210 the instability of the area which was achieved by the dissents
of those two Justices must have assisted the Knox Court in its resolve to reject
the doctrines. More generally, a persistent pattern of disagreement in other areas
of the law (say, the interpretation of ss 90 and 92 of the Constitution, to take two
troublesome examples) has prevented the locking in of any majority view for a
substantial period of time. The willingness of recent judges to adopt a line of
persistent dissent211 indicates that there must be something in the practice. In
order to understand why some judges more than others are drawn to employ it,
let alone to pass comment upon its effects in respect of the standing and proce-
dures of the institution of the Court itself, some research must be performed
which demonstrates the consequences of persistent dissent for the development
of the law.212
V  CONCLUSION
The tradition of individual expression found in Australian courts has been an
unquestioned and largely unexamined part of our inheritance from the English
legal system. Wherever the common law has taken root, so too has the ability of
209 Federal Maritime Commission v South Carolina State Ports Authority, 535 US 743, 788 (2002)
(Breyer J; Stevens, Souter and Bader Ginsburg JJ agreeing).
210 Beyond the inherent weaknesses of the doctrines themselves are the considerations raised by
Windeyer J in Victoria v Commonwealth (1971) 122 CLR 353, 395–7 (‘Payroll Tax Case’).
211 See above n 200 and accompanying text.
212 Kelman has argued that the dissenting judge faces not two, but three options in subsequent
cases. The choice is not so stark as to be between acceptance of the unpalatable precedent or its
continued rejection through repeated dissent. Instead, the judge may temporarily acquiesce in the
authority of the earlier decision, ‘counting on time and tide to bring about a reconsideration of
the precedent, reserv[ing] the right to join, indeed to rally, his colleagues to an express reversal
when the moment is opportune’: Kelman, above n 133, 259. There are several problems with the
existence of a general path of ‘temporary acquiescence’ open to past dissenters, however. The
issue of identification aside, the theoretical difficulty with the ‘third way’ is its ambivalence with
respect to precedent. Much more so than persistent dissent, temporary acquiescence demon-
strates a particularly cynical stance towards the values of stare decisis. Kelman’s theory of
temporary acquiescence will be difficult to observe — and may indeed be problematic as a
theory explaining judicial action. That latter judgment cannot be conclusively made until an
attempt to chart the existence of temporary acquiescence is seriously undertaken. Until such time
as that work is performed in respect of the High Court of Australia, any further comment re-
mains merely speculative.
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judges to give independent voice. Even in the United States Supreme Court,
despite Marshall CJ’s efforts, Johnson J kept alive the ability to dissent and,
increasingly, the ‘middle way’213 of judgment delivery resembles the seriatim
practice.
The High Court of Australia has, on the whole, had few qualms about this
mode of opinion delivery. Indeed, for much of its first 100 years, the Court has
been blithely indifferent to the replication of effort which manifold concurring
judgments involves. This has, as discussed, been the source of a deal of criticism
in recent decades and the present Court assures us that it is aware of the problem
and is taking steps to alleviate it, though its success in doing so is open to
question.214 As part of this individualism, dissents have generally attracted little
attention. When they have, it has most often been in respect of particular justices.
Even then, though, the dissenting itself is in many ways seen simply as a by-
product of the novel judicial approach being employed. The substance of
disagreement has tended to obscure examination of the act of disagreement itself.
However, to reiterate, any attempt to understand dissent on its own terms
requires acknowledgment of its chiefly relational, rather than substantive, nature.
It is a disinclination to separate the two which presumably explains the absence
of an Australian study of dissent itself.
In attempting to fill this gap, this article has necessarily drawn on comparative
materials fairly extensively. With the content of disagreement to one side, the
role, functions and liabilities of dissent are germane to discussions of judicial
method generally. The American literature has trod much of this ground already,
albeit in the much more politically-charged atmosphere of the Supreme Court. To
extend those principles and propositions to the High Court has simultaneously
demonstrated their universality and shed light on a little appreciated, yet power-
ful, feature of the Court’s work.
Dissent in Australia’s highest court presents largely the same advantages and
activates the same concerns as it does elsewhere. To recap those arguments,
disagreement through individual expression offers significant assistance in
legitimising judicial review through its demonstrated commitment to principles
of deliberative democracy; it provides a competitive stimulus to the production
of judgments resulting in better reasoned opinions and even, in some cases, the
securing of consensus; and importantly, it allows room for innovation so that the
law can change and develop in a transparent and coherent way. Of course, there
is a fine line between this last function and a profusion of individual opinions
weakening both the state of the law and the authority of the court from which it
emanates. For these reasons, instances of judges holding back from their
preferred view of a matter are not so difficult to find.
While there are numerous benefits in allowing disagreement to be aired by
individuals, there remains a sense of harm that may be done to the institution as a
consequence. This is especially so in the case of a strain of persistent dissent
over a particular issue — a phenomenon from which the High Court has not been
213 Bader Ginsburg, above n 58, 134.
214 Andrew Lynch, ‘The Gleeson Court on Constitutional Law: An Empirical Analysis of Its First
Five Years’ (2003) 26 University of New South Wales Law Journal 32, 49, 61–2.
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immune. As was seen, the values of stare decisis are often to be found at the
heart of a divided court. Although the doctrine of precedent aims to ensure
consistency and stability in the law, its correct application in any given case
cannot help being a fault-line over which the judges may disagree, particularly in
a final court.
It should be apparent from preceding sections of this article that dissent and
minority concurring judgments are an inevitable feature of common law courts.
To that extent, delivery of some ultimate verdict in favour or against the filing of
separate judgments is futile. A capacity for individual expression is bound to be
employed. Although there is sense behind calls for fewer needless concurrences,
minority judgments will continue to be filed regardless of generalised pleas for
restraint. The frequency of such minority judgments will vary — despite all
pronouncements to the contrary — on the composition of the bench more than
any other factor. A strong institutional voice is to be expected when the individu-
als of which the court is comprised share a very similar outlook — not just to the
problems they face, but also to the values inherent in questions of precedent and
change. Apart from that seeming an unlikely trick to pull off given the vagaries
of the appointment process, it is not hard to imagine that such smug certainty
across the court’s judges might be a less than desirable thing. Dissent occurs
over matters of substance, but in doing so it conveys a sense of the differences
which exist between the legitimate methods of the justices themselves. It affirms
that a degree of diversity is contained within the institution, which is often
glossed over by stereotyping its members.215
It is human nature that opposition to the voicing of dissent is generally stirred
only when the commentator believes the minority’s view of a case to be wrong:
were the positions reversed, she or he would likely be thankful that the flaws of
the majority are so effectively exposed by the dissentient. That is probably the
key to a true appreciation of individual judgments voicing disagreement — they
may cancel the ‘monolithic solidarity’ of the court but in doing so they allow
engagement by a wider audience with its decisions. The myths of infallibility
and omnipotence are worth sacrificing in order to show that the capacity for
deliberation in the wider community is matched by that found within the court.
215 This is not to say that I find the present Court sufficiently diverse, but simply that dissent
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